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Increasing complexity of economic and social problems during the past forty years has done much to revolutionize previously
accepted legal concepts, particularly in the field of torts. Through
techniques involving the concept of "contributory negligence as a
matter of law" courts have often staked out the boundary lines
of legal fault within which a jury might determine whether the
conduct of litigating parties had met the standard of care required
of a reasonably prudent individual confronted with similar circumstances. It long since has been accepted that, particularly in
tort cases, legal techniques arising from accepted precedents are
often applied by courts in reaching conclusions ultimately predicated on the attitude of the judicial body toward social, economic
and equitable considerations implicit in the facts in the controversy
at hand. If this be true (and few practitioners will deny it), it
well may be said that the doctrine of assumption of risk has become one of the more clumsy tools in the judicial kit.
The use of the term "assumption of risk" has involved a
variety of factual situations, in which judicial techniques have not
always been similar. In the following pages it is sought to examine
the problem through a general survey of the fields in which the
term has been employed, its relation to the doctrine of contributory
negligence, the sources out of which the doctrine emerged, and
the prerequisites to an application of the rule in current litigation. Since the use of the doctrine has most recently become general in litigation involving the automobile host and guest rela*Professor of Law, Washburn Municipal University School of Law,
Topeka, Kansas.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

tionship, a detailed analysis of the use of the assumption of risk
concept in that field may be illustiative of problems inherent in
the contemporary use of the concept.
I. THE EXTENSION OF THE USE OF THE TERMS "AssuMPTION
OF RIsK" AND "VOLENTI

NON FIT INJURIA"

The roots of the doctrine so far as it embodies the maxim
"volenti non fit injuria"stretch deep into Continental jurisprudence

and the English common law. There is some indication that it was
recognized by Aristotle.' "'Scienti et consentienti non fit injuria
neque dolus" was an accepted principle of the early canon law
of Rome, 2 and the rule also obtained approval in Roman civil

statutes embodied in the Justinian code.3 It was subsequently
adopted very generally throughout Europe,4 and a record of its
application is found as early as 1304 in England. 5 The earlier
Roman use of the doctrine seems to have been limited to cases in
which actual consent to injury was shown, but the strong inclination of the courts to imply consent on the part of a plaintiff where
it would seem unconscionable to allow recovery was exemplified
in the earliest recorded English case on the subject, 6 and the
construction there affirmed was later illustrated by Bracton.7
IN. G. L. Child, 18 Juridical Rev. (1906) 73, cited by 1 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, (1906) 162, and see 1 Bevan, Negligence, (1908)

632. Literally interpreted, the maxim simply means that "To him who consents,2 no wrong is done."
Sext. v. De Regulis Juris 28.
3
Both 1 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, (1906) 162, and 1 Bevan,
Negligence, (1928) 787, support this conclusion through reference to the
rule that "Nulla injuria est quae in volentem fiat," in the Justinian code,
D. 47, 10, 1, sec. 5. See also Lord Watson's decision in Smith v. Baker &
Sons, [1891] A. C. 325, 60 L. J. Q. B. 683, 65 L. T. 467, 55 J. P. 660, 7
T. L. R. 679, where it is said at 355 that the maxim was originally borrowed from the civil law, citing the familiar example of an individual who
sold himself as a slave and thereby was precluded from later objecting to
his status.
4Cf. Valin, "Du Capitaine," Art. 12. Consol. del Mar. ch. 183, and
Richelieu & 0. Nay. Co. v. St. Jean, (1883) 28 L. C. J. (Q.B.) 91, applying
the French law in Quebec.
5See De Richmond's Case, Y. B. 33-35 Edw. I (Horwood's ed. 1879)
8, where cattle were claimed to be held under an agistor's lien and where
it was urged that a previous adverse decision concerning title to the land
should be no bar to a further assertion of defendant's title to the land on
the theory of adverse possession, to which counsel suggested that since the
defendants had themselves brought the previous writ they could not complain--"volenti non fit injuria."
"Ibid.
76 Bracton, De Legibus Angliae 263, Folio 413 b (Twiss Ed. 1883):
"There are also certain writs which are called magisterial, and are often
varied according to the variety of the cases and complaints, and some are
personal and some are mixed according as the actions are diverse and
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Meanwhile the rule was receiving approval in cases involving
actual consent," not only in tort but in contract litigation.9 Certainly few principles in the law come closer to a realization of
the "natural justice" concept of jurisprudence than that a litigant,
who has in fact consented to an invasion of what might otherwise be termed a "right," cannot complain of conduct which he
has specifically authorized. The most familiar use of the maxim
and of the doctrine of assumption of risk concerns relationships
involving employer and employee, the concept first being created
in Priestly v. Fowler,"' which held in substance that a servant
assumed the obvious incidental risks of his employment with
the master. Chief Justice Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme
Court promptly made application of the rule,:" and during the
following twenty-five years the concept received repeated approval,
2
especially in the English courts.1

The use of the maxim was, however, not new when the master
and servant cases arose, even as to cases which involved an implied rather than an actual consent to injury. The standard case
varied, because there will be as many formulas of writs as there are kinds
of actions, because a person cannot bring an action without a writ, since
another person is not obliged to make answer to him without a writ, unless
he has gratuitously been willing to do so, as to a person who is knowing
and willing no injury is done." (In the Latin text, it is reported: "cum
scientae et volenti non fit injuria.")
bSee Duberly v. Gunning, (1792) Durn. & E. 656, wherein Lord Kenyon cites Cibber v. Sloper, (1738) Bull, N. P. (5th Ed.) 27. See also
Norton v. Jason, (1653) Sty. 398, applying the maxim in a seduction proceeding.
[See, e. g., Rohr v. Kindt, (1842) 3 Watts & S. (Pa.) 563, 39 Am. Dec.
53, as to circumstances under which one taking an insecure title "takes the
risk on himself." The volenti maxim was also invoked in an early patent
case involving an action on the case. See Byam v. Bullard, (C.C. Mass.
1852) 1 Curt. 100, Fed Cas. No. 2,262.
1OPriestly v. Fowler, (1837) 3 M. & W. 1, Murp. & H. 305, 7 L. J.
Ex. 42. This interpretation of the case was followed and applied in several
later English cases prior to the adoption of the Employer's Liability Act.
Some, but not all, of the cases relied on the volenti maxim. See, e. g.,
Hutchinson v. York, N. & B. Ry., (1850) 5 Ex. 35, 19 L. J.Ex. 296, 15
L. T. 0. S.230; Skipp v. Eastern Counties Ry. Co., (1853) 9 Ex. 223, 23
L. J. Ex. 23, 2. C. L. R. 185; Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Reid, (1858) 3
Macq. 277, 31 L. T. 0. S.255, 22 J,P. 560; and Britton v. Great Western
Cotton Co., (1872) L. R. 7 Ex. 130, 41 L. J.Ex. 99, 27 L. T. 125; Senior
v. Ward, (1859) 1 El. & El. 385, 28 L. J.Q. B. 139, 32 L. T. 0. S.252.
It has been thought, however, that the actual basis of the decision in
Priestly v. Fowler was that a host owed a guest no duty as to dangers unknown to either. See Kambour v. Boston & M. R. Co. (1913) 77 N. H. 33,
86 AtI. 624, 45 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1188, and Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk (1906) 20 Harv. L. Rev. 14, 28-29, citing decision of Pollock,
C. J., in Southcote v. Stanley, (1856) 1 H. & N. 247, 25 L. J.Ex. 339, 27
L. T. 0. S. 173, so considering the case.
"'Farwell v. B. &. W. R. R., (1842) 4 Metc. (Mass.) 57.
12 See note 10 supra.
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cited to establish legal fault under the maxim in host-guest cases
has been that of Ilott v. Wilkes, 13 where the plaintiff, a trespasser
with knowledge of spring guns on defendant's premises, was precluded from recovering damages for injuries received from one
of the weapons, and in which it seems clear that the court intended to define and limit the duty of the owner of the premises
toward a person who came upon them with knowledge of present
perils, through adoption of principles arising from the volcnti
concept.
The maxim has not infrequently been used in cases where the
conduct of the guest, rather than the original duty of the host,
was at issue. In the decision in Clayards v. Dethick and Davis,1'"
it seems to have been suggested that urgent necessity in the proper
use of one's property suspends the operation of the maxim, and in
Lax v. Darlington Corporation,15 Lord Bramwell discussed the
doctrine at some length. The decision of the majority of the court
in Woodley v. Metropolitan District Railway Company, 6 decided
in 1877, appears also to rest upon the volenti concept. The application of the doctrine to cases involving the conduct of a
13(1820) 3 Barn. & AId. 304. The ruling was soon specifically abrogated by statute (Stat. 7 & 8 Geo. IV, ch. 18, 24 & 25 Vic., ch. 100, sec. 31)
and was disapproved on the theory that a "trap" was created, in America.
See Johnson v. Patterson, (1840) 14 Conn. 1, and Palmer v. Gordon, (1899).
174 Mass. 410, 53 N. E. 909. In so far as the use of the volenti maxim
is concerned, however, the holding in the case has not been disputed except
as to the application of the doctrine to the specific facts there involved. The
maxim was subsequently referred to as inapplicable in a case where a trespasser was injured by a spring gun which he did not know was upon the
premises. Bird v. Holbrook, (1828) 4 Bing. 628, 1 M. & P. 607, 2 Man.
& Ry. M. C. 198.
14(1848) 12 Q. B. 439. The case was, however, criticized in Lax v.
Darlington Corporation, (1879) 5 Ex. Div. 35, 49 L. J. Q. B. 105, 41 L. T.
489, 44 J. P. 312, and questioned in ML'Mahon v. Field, (1881), 7 Q. B. D.
594, 50 L. J. Q. B. 552, 45 L. T. 381, 46 J. P. 245, it being suggested that
the court under the circumstances in the Clayards case ought not have
allowed the jury to decide whether plaintiff had persisted, notwithstanding
express warning, in running upon a great and obvious danger.
15(1879) 5 Ex. Div. 35, 49 L. J. Q. B. 105, 41 L. T. 489, 44 J. P. 312.
16(1877) 2 Ex. Div. 384, 46 L. J. Q. B. 521, 36 L. T. 419, 42 J. P. 181.
Plaintiff in this case, employee of an independent contractor, was injured
by a passing train while working in a railroad tunnel with knowledge of all
surrounding conditions. Even in the absence of a master-servant relationship with the defendant, it was held that he assumed the risk of injury.
(But cf. Heaven v. Pender, (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 503, 52 L. J. Q. B. 702,
49 L. T. 357, 47 J. P. 709, where recovery was allowed against the third
party where his equipment was defective.) Most American courts follow
the principal case. See cases collected in annotation at 44 A. L. R. 1122.
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guest, as a bar to an action by him against the host, was subsequently definitively made in 1888.1
While questions as to its application in highway cases generally
had arisen before the beginning of the nineteenth century,18 the
maxim was not called into use in host-guest relationships involving vehicular travel until the case of Priestly v. Fowler, 9 in
which this aspect of the concept is at best imperfectly set forth. It
was suggested in 1888 by Grantham, J., that the defense of "assumption of risk" in relation to the conduct of the guest rather
than the initial duty of the host was not applicable in vehicular
cases,2" and the doctrine was finally rejected for all purposes in
automobile accident cases in England.2 1 In this country, reference to assumption of risk was first made in 1840, the federal
court emphasizing in its charge to the jury that the passenger
assumed the risk of accidents arising without negligence of the
driver of a livery coach,2 2 and the doctrine was soon carried over
17111 Osborne v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co., (1888)
21 Q. B. D. 220, 57 L. J.
Q. B. 618, 59 L. T. 227, 52 J P. 806, 4 T. L. R. 591, wherein Wills J., set
up the standard of care required by the defendant railroad, on whose icy
steps plaintiff slipped, and suggested that where defendant sought to rely
on the defense of assumption of risk after a finding by the jury that no
contributory negligence was present, defendants "must obtain a finding
that plaintiff freely and voluntarily with full knowledge of the nature and
extent of the risk he ran, impliedly agreed to incur it."
"See note 27 infra, and text.

'Cited at note 10 supra. But see Southcote's case, (1601) 4 Co. Rep.
83, wherein the term is casually mentioned in a dictum.
","For instance, in the case of a stage coach, if a passenger sees that
one of the horses is vicious, is he bound to stay at home and give up his
journey, or if he does not do so, and suffers injury, is he to lose all

remedy?' Osborne v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co., (1888) 21 Q. B. D. 220, 57
L. J. Q. B. 618, 59 L. T. 227, 52 J. P. 806, 4 T. L. R. 591.
-t Dann v. Hamilton, [1939] 1 K. B. 509, 55 L. T. R. 297, 108 L. J. K.
B. 255, 160 L. T. 433, per Asquith, J. But actual consent to placing of
property in a dangerous position on the deck of a ship may debar the owner
thereof from later complaining of damage suffered thereby. See Gould v.
Oliver, (1837) 4 Bing. N. C. 134, 3 Hodg. 307, 5 Scott 445, 7 L. J. C. P. 68,
wherein Tridal, C. J., refers to "the general rule of English law, that no one
can maintain an action for a wrong, where he has consented or contributed
to the act which occasions his loss."

-.'McKinney v. Neil, (C.C. Ohio 1840) 1 'McLean 540, Fed. Cas. No.
8865, the court saying: "We are surrounded with dangers at home and abroad:
and they are greater when we travel than while we remain stationary. In
sonic modes of traveling these dangers are greater than in others. They
may be greater on water than on land; on a fast line of stages than on a
slow one. And every passenger must make up his mind to meet the risks
incident to the mode of travel he adopts, which cannot be avoided by the
utmost degree of care and skill in the preparation and management of the
means of conveyance."

328
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into railroad2 3 and ferry cases.2' It was in this same sense that
it was used in a case decided in 1918, involving the automobile
25
guest-host relationship.
The volenti maxim, used in measuring the standard of care
required of a plaintiff, seems originally to have been used also in
determining the respective rights of strangers using public ways
before the courts had made any effort to determine the extent
of the dichotomy between the doctrine of assumption of risk and
that of contributory negligence . 2 The doctrine was suggested in
Cruden v. FentWm 27 decided in 1799, where one was killed by
collision with a chaise as he wilfully drove to his lawful side of
the highway in order to assert what he termed the right of the
road, and recovery was denied because the deceased "was putting
himself voluntarily into the way of danger, and the injury was
of his own seeking." Other early cases made use of the "assumption of risk" phraseology in defining the rights of parties using
streets and highways, both in determining the duty owed to injured parties, 28 and in establishing a standard of care to which an
injured party must conform. 25 The use of the term in cases in2
3See, e. g., Galena & C. U. R. R. Co. v. Fay, (1855) 16 Ill. 558, and
Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Hazzard, (1861) 26 III. 373. In the latter case it
was suggested that ".... a passenger takes all the risks incident to the mode
of travel, and the character of the means of conveyance which he selects,
the party furnishing the conveyance being only required to adapt the proper
care, vigilance and skill to that particular means." And where an employee
with limited powers permitted the plaintiff's intestate to ride on the employer's train, without the knowledge of the employer, plaintiff was debarred from recovery because "the intestate was in the position of one consenting to bear a risk as a volunteer, a guest, a servant, or a bare
licensee; and the principle on which cases relating to those classes are determined apply to him" and that intestate "voluntarily assumed the risk from
which
24 he suffered." Morris v. Brown, (1888) 111 N. Y. 312, 18 N. E. 722.
Selp v. Dunn, (1871) 42 Ga. 528.
25
Avery v. Thompson, (1918) 117 Me. 120, 103 AtI. 4. The case contains numerous references to cases establishing the general rules for liability
of a host to an automobile guest.
26As to the distinction between assumption of risk and contributory
negligence, see notes 50-107 infra, and text.
27(1799) 2 Esp. 685. Clay v. Wood, (1803) 5 Esp. 44, involved substantially similar circumstances, although in that case the plaintiff was on
the wrong side of the road, having voluntarily put himself into a position of
danger. Lord Ellenborough failed to apply the defenses of assumption of
risk or contributory negligence because of the wanton nature of the
act.
defendant's
28
See, e. g., Illedge v. Goodwin, (1831) 5 C. & P. 190, wherein the
court held that "if a man chooses to leave a cart standing in the street,
he must take the risk of any mischief that may be done," and Clayards v.
Dethick & Davis, (1848) 12 Q. B. 439.
29Where the defense of assumption of risk was urged where plaintiff
was injured in attempting to board a train, the court cited and adopted the
decision in Fitzgerald v. Connecticut River Paper Co., (1891) 155 Mass. 155,
29 N. E. 464, to the effect that "One who knows of a danger from the negli-
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volving rescues seems to have arisen from an early decision of
the New York court.30 The Massachusetts court specifically
adopted and applied the doctrine in 1898 in denying recovery to
a spectator injured by explosives at a fireworks exhibition, 31 thus
gence of another, and understands and appreciates the risk therefrom, and
voluntarily exposes himself to it, is precluded from recovering for an
injury which results from the exposure" (said with reference to the masterservant relationship). Robinson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., (1893) 5 Misc. Rep.
209, 25 N. Y. S.91. And where plaintiff's horse shied while crossing a
railroad track, and the defense of assumption of risk was urged, the jury
having found that no contributory negligence existed, the court concluded
that "It cannot be held . .. as a matter of law, that a person who travels
over a defective street, with knowledge of the defects therein, or who drives
by an obvious obstruction in a public thoroughfare, thereby assumes the
risk of injury and is precluded from recovering against one who is
responsible for the defect, or who has negligently caused the obstruction."
Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Prescott, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1893) 59 Fed. 237.
And see Dayton v. Taylor's Adm'r, (1900) 62 Oh. St. 11, 56 N. E. 480,
applying doctrines of both assumption of risk and contributory negligence.
The Kansas court held, however, that a teamster standing on loose, narrow
dump boards while going over a railroad track which had been in an
unsafe condition for months, voluntarily incurred the danger and was
barred from recovery, apparently making application of the doctrine of
assumption or risk and that of contributory negligence. Reynolds v. Mo.
K. & T. Ry. Co., (1904) 70 Kan. 341, 79 Pac. 801. In many similar cases
the terminology "assumes the danger" or "undertakes the risk" or similar
phrases are used, but the ultimate basis for the decision has been upon
classification of the conduct of the plaintiff as constituting (or failing to
constitute) contributory negligence as a matter of law. See e. g., McHugh
v. City of St. Paul, (1897) 67 Minn. 441, 70 N. W. 5; Nichols v. Laurens,
(1895) 96 Ia. 388, 65 N. W. 335; and Stearns v. Walpole, (1898) 76 Mo.
App. 213. See also Wilson v. Charlestown, (1864) 8 Allen (Mass.) 137.
"If a person knows a way to be dangerous when he enters upon it, he
cannot, in the exercise of ordinary prudence, proceed and take his chance,
and, if he shall actually sustain damage, look to the town for indemnity,"
and Reed v. Northfield, (1832) 13 Pick. (Mass.) 94, upon which the case
of Wilson v. Charlestown is ultimately based, which treats the problem as
one of contributory negligence purely.
3"Eckert v. Long Island R. Co., (1871) 43 N. Y. 502. While this
case has almost universally been cited as establishing "assumption of risk"
in these cases, the court here considered the problem solely on the basis of
contributory negligence, as did the court in the next principal case (in
point of time), of Peyton v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., (1889) 41 La. Ann. 861,
6 So. 690; the standard of care of the intestate in the Eckert case being
said to be for the jury concerning whether the deceased was reckless in
voluntarily placing himself in a position where he might receive injury.
See also Corbin v. City of Philadelphia, (1900) 195 Pa. St. 461, 45 Atl.
1070, and cases cited.
31Scanlon v. Wedger, (1892) 156 Mass. 462; 31 N. E. 642: "A voluntary spectator, who is present merely for the purpose of witnessing the
display, must be held to consent to it, and he suffers no legal wrong if
accidentally injured without negligence on the part of anyone, although the
show was unauthorized. He takes the risk." It would seem that the
rule here announced goes to the question of the "duty" of the operator of
the amusement enterprise, as distinguished from the standard of conduct
required of the plaintiff, which appears to be the basis in the rescue cases
cited in the preceding note. There is no claim in any case that the
plaintiff failed to measure up to any standard of conduct (excepting that
he might have stayed at home) and the cases clearly deal with the "duty"
of the defendant to insure that the plaintiff shall come to no harm. See
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laying the foundation for the application of the concept in later
cases involving onlookers and participants in diverse types of
entertainment.
II.

CREATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ASSUMPTION

OF RISK GENERALLY

The limitations on the operation of the doctrine of assumption
of risk are substantially the same as'those in the application of
the volenti maxim, for it has been quite generally accepted that,
at least in so far as the phrase "assumption of risk" concerns
relationships beyond the field of master and servant, the doctrine
arose from the maxim and is in fact presently used interchange-

ably with it.32 Under the maxim, of course, actual consent was
especially, Potts v. Crafts, (1935) 5 Cal. App. (2d) 83, 42 P. (2d) 87;
Connoly v. Palisades Realty and Amusement Company, (1933), 11 N. J.
Misc. 841, 168 Atl. 419, holding in substance that the operator owes a duty
to the guest to see that other patrons obey the rules regulating the
amusement; Quinn v. Recreation Park Ass'n, (1935) 3 Cal. (2d) 725, 46 P.
(2d) 144; and Ingersoll v. Onondaga Hockey Club, (1935) 245 App. Div.
137, 281 N. Y. S. 505. But in the case of moving rides, the doctrine may go
much more clearly to a meaasurement of the standard of care exercised
by the plaintiff. See Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., (1929) 250
N. Y. 479, 166 N. E. 173, in which the plaintiff had been engaged in riding
"the Flopper." But in all cases, the essential problem discussed has
been the negligence (or violation of duty) of the defendant, rather than
the conduct
of the plaintiff as demonstrating legal fault.
32
Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Norgate, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1905) 141 Fed.
247; Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Walker, (1909) 164 Ala. 33, 51 So. 169;
McGeever v. O'Byrne, (1919) 203 Ala. 266, 82 So. 508; Valencia v. San
Jose Scavenger Co., (1937) 21 Cal. App. (2d) 469, 69 P. (2d) 480; Denver
& R. G. R. Co. v. Gannon, (1907) 40 Colo. 195, 90 Pac. 853; Belevicze v.
Platt, (1911) 84 Conn. 632, 81 Atl. 339; Ross v. Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co.,
(1909) 243 Ill. 440, 90 N. E. 701; White v. McVicker, (1933) 216 Iowa
90, 246 N. W. 385; Reid v. Eastern S. S. Co., (1914) 112 Me. 34, 90 Atl.
609; O'Maley v. So. Boston Gas Lt. Co., (1893) 158 Mass. 135, 32 N. E.
1119; Fotheringill v. W"ashoe Copper Co., (1911) 43 Mont. 485, 117 Pac. 86;
Buckingham v. Eagle Warehouse & Storage Co., (1919) 189 App. Div. 760.
179 N. Y. S. 218; M. R. & L. E. R. Co. v. Barber, (1856) 5 Oh. St. 541;
Choctaw, 0., & G. R. Co. v. Jones, (1906) 77 Ark. 367, 92 S. W. 244:
and an unusual discussion of the maxim in Carleton v. E. & T. Fairbanks
and Co., (1915) 88 Vt. 537, 93 Atl. 462, confining the application of volenti
to risks arising from the negligence of the employer, to which the servant
understandingly exposes himself. See also Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of
Risk, (1906) 20 Harv. L. Rev. 14-16; Harper, The Law of Torts (1933)
290; 3 Labatt, Master and Servant (1913) 3610-3613; Prosser, Torts
(1941) 117; Shearman and Redfield, The Law of Negligence (1913) 391; 1
Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (1906) 162. Of course, the English
courts specifically adopted the volenti doctrine to form the basis for
assumption of risk where applicable. See Smith v. Baker & Sons [18911
A. C. 325, 60 L. J. Q. B. 683, 65 L. T. 467, 55 J. P. 660, 7 T. L. R. 679,
and Thomas v. Quartermaine, (1887) 18 Q. B. D. 696, 65 L. J. Q. B. 340,
57 L. T. 537, 51 J. P. 516, 3 T. L. R. 495. It should be noted, however,
that many American cases involving master and servant relationships are
bottomed on a basis of implied contract between the parties and not on the
maxim. For a collection of case references dealing with the subject, ste
4 \Words & Phrases (Per. Ed.) 607, ff., on "Assumption of Risk" and 44
Words & Phrases (Per Ed.) 369-71 on Volenti Non Fit Injuria. See also
note 37, infra.
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originally necessary. In the development of the rule between
master and servant, consent to incur risk might easily be implied
from the contract, whether through the medium of the maxim or
without it, thus precluding recovery by the employee. And in
cases where there was neither contract nor actual consent, it was
natural for the courts to imply, as a matter of law, either a contract by the injured party releasing the defendant from liability
for certain risks, or a consent by the injured party that the injurer should be released from legal fault, and that he would
himself "assume the risk" of certain known dangers. 33 But this
rationale was not universally accepted, and an understanding of
the refusal of some jurisdictions to accept this extension of the
rule involves reference to the doctrine as applied in the masterservant relationship. State adoption of Workmen's Compensation
acts," and recent amendments to the Federal Employers' Liability
Act,3" have rendered the study of the doctrine in cases of master
and servant largely academic.
The bases suggested for the rule in the master-servant field
varied, and such variance was later determinative of the adoption
of the doctrine in other fields. The ultimate principles governing
application of the rule in master and servant cases in the United
States, generally considered to have arisen more or less independently of the volenti maxim, are substantially identical with
those prevailing in England after the shift of the English courts
from reliance on the doctrine expressed in Priestly v. Fowler to
that of volenti non fit injuria.36 But notwithstanding the development of the assumption of risk-volenti doctrine abroad, some state
courts refused to recognize that the volenti maxim was an all
pervasive principle, and held that the doctrine of assumption of
- ; Both Professor Harper, The Law of Torts, (1933) 290, and Labatt,
Master and Servant, (1913) 3610, have suggested that the courts have not
clarified the theory of "implied agreement," and Labatt suggests that the
basis for the doctrine of assumption of risk in the absence of specific contractual agreement must be sought in the volenti maxim. But there
would seem to be no more objection, either in theory or practice, to
inventing an implied agreement upon which duty is based than to creating
an implied "consent" establishing similar conditions regarding duty.
3
-Only Mississippi has no such statute. See Prosser, Torts, (1941)
519.
3545 U. S. C. sec. 54. In a few cases, the distinction between assumption of risk and contributory negligence in such cases may yet become
important. See Note, (1939) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 341.
21See discussion of the subject by Professor Warren in Volenti non Fit
Injuria, (190S) 8 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 468, 469.
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risk could be applied only to contractual cases involving the
37
relationship of master and servant.
Courts, seeking to justify the application of the maxim to
fields where it had not traditionally been applied, fortified their
decisions with diverse arguments. Many of them adopted a
theory, often implicit and unexpressed, that the consent forming
the basis of the maxim was to be found in the voluntary conduct
of the plaintiff in view of the relationship between the parties.
Obviously a limitation of this nature was indispensable to effective use of the doctrine, or else, as Mellish, J., had suggested,38
a pedestrian acquainted with the consistent misconduct of the
driver of a vehicle would be barred from recovering for damages
suffered in consequence of such misconduct. This extension of the
doctrine met with little favor in England, though the conclusion in
Ilott v. Wilkes must be considered to rest in part on the relationship of the parties as owner and trespasser. Pollock, in criticising
3

7See Note, (1905) 9 Law Notes 89; Conrad v. Springfield Consol. R.
Co., (1909) 240 Ill. 12, 88 N. E. 180; Walsh v. Moore, (1929) 244 Ill. App.
458; Reed v. Zellers, (1933) 273 Ill. App. 18; Columbia Creosoting Co.
v. Beard, (1909) 44 Ind. App. 310, 89 N. E. 321; (but see Munson v.
Rupker, (1923) 96 Ind App. 15, 148 N. E. 169 holding that a guest takes
the driver of an automobile as he finds him, in substance applying the
doctrine as a measure of the duty of the host); Lexington R. Co. v.
Cropper, (1911) 142 Ky. 39, 133 S. W. 968; (but compare Standard Oil
Co. v. Titus, (1920) 187 Ky. 560, 219 S. W. 1077) ; Broseau v. Kellogg
Switchboard and Supply Co., (1909) 158 Mich. 312, 122 N. W. 620; Fish v.
Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., (1914) 263 Mo. 106, 172 S. W. 340; (but see
Burt v. Nichols, (1915) 264 Mo. 1, 173 S. W. 681) ; Kambour v. Boston &
M. R. R., (1913) 77 N. H. 33, 86 AtI. 624; Dubiver v. City R. Co., (1904)
44 Or. 227, 74 Pac. 915; Carter v. Kansas City So. R. Co., (Tex. Civ. App.
1913) 155 S. W. 638; Buick Automobile Co. v. Weaver, (Tex. Civ. App.
1914) 163 S. W. 594; Curtiss-Wright Flying Service v. Williamson, (Tex.
Civ. App. 1932); 51 S. W. (2d) 1047; Chicago & N. W. Ry. v. Prescott,
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1893) 59 Fed. 237, semble; Hallstein v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1929) 30 Fed. (2d) 594; So. Pac. R. Co. v.
McCready,
C.C.A. 9th Cir 1931) 47 Fed. (2d) 673.
38
in WVoodley v. Metropolitan S. R. Co., (1877) 2 Ex. Div. 384, 46
L. J. Q. B. 521, 36 L. T. 419, 42 J. P. 181, Lord Mellish says: "Suppose
this case: a man is employed by a contractor for cleansing the street, to
scrape a particular street, and for the space of a fortnight he has the
opportunity of observing that a particular hansom cabman drives his
cab with extremely little regard for the safety of the men who scrape the
streets. At the end of a fortnight the man who scrapes the streets is
negligently run over by the cabman. An action is brought in the county
court, and the cabman says in his defence: 'You know my style of driving,
you had seen me drive for a fortnight, I was only driving in my usual
style.' 'Yes, but your usual style of driving is a very negligent style, and
my having seen you drive a fortnight has nothing to do with it.' It will
not be disputed that the scraper of the streets in the case I have supposed
is entitled to maintain his action, and in my opinion his case does not
differ from the one we have to determine, there being no contract between
the defendants and the plaintiff any more than between the cabman and the

scraper of the streets."
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the rule, conceived that the theory ought to be that "the doctrine
of voluntary exposure to risk has no application as between
parties on an equal footing of right, of whom one does not go
out of his way more than the other," which would seem to permit
the application of the rule to "relational" interests, though he
then remarks that "A man is not bound at his peril to fly from a
risk from which it is another's duty to protect him, merely because
the risk is known."3" In an English decision in 1938, the court refused to extend the "relational" concept to include automobile
guests within the doctrine of assumption of risk.40
In this country, courts specifically passing upon the question
have for the most part limited the doctrine by applying it primarily
to "relational" interests, although the doctrine has unaccountably
also been applied betveen strangers. 41 In an early article on the
subject, Professor Warren expressed this limitation on the volenti
maxim in suggesting that "where* plaintiff and defendant are
simply members of the same general community, occupying no
specific relation to each other, then each is bound to use ordinary
care toward the other, and the fact that the plaintiff knows that
the defendant negligently does something which may bring him an
injury, is not conclusive that the plaintiff has assumed the risk
of the danger from the negligence.

' 42

In Wisconsin the transition

from the strict contractual conception of the doctrine in master
and servant cases to include that of a relational interest was at
first accomplished by a tour de force, although subsequently it
was explained that "While the relation of guest and host is not
contractual, it is consensual."'' 3 Some commentators and courts
have concluded that even with respect to the master and servant
relationship, the doctrine is consensual, 44 and the theory that the
doctrine is based upon consent in the absence of other contractual
requirements has been suggested with reference particularly to
the field of the automobile guest.42 In discussing the problem in
1906, Street combined both the consensual and contractual conceptions of limitations on the operation of the doctrine, pointing
:1 Pollock, The Law of Torts (1923) 169, 170.
4"Dann v. Hamilton, [1939] 1 K. B. 509, 55 T. L. R. 297, 108 L..J. K.
B. 255, 160 L. T. 433.
41See infra, notes 163-5, 176, and text.
-'Warren, Volenti Non Fit Injuria, (1908) 8 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 471.
C;Cf. Biersach v. Wechselberg, (1931) 206 Wis. 113, 238 N. W. 905
with Switzer v. Weiner, (1939) 230 Wis. 599, 284 N. W. 509.
4"See Prosser, Torts, (1941) 385 and cases cited; see also text
statements cited in note 32 supra.
45White, Liability of an Automobile Driver to a Non-Paying Passenger, (1934) 20 Va. L. Rev. 326, 348.
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The "relational"
out that in substance they were identical.4
limitation of the doctrine is equally apparent in cases treating
the concept as a limitation of the duty of the host. This is apparent
in the holdings in automobile guest cases that the guest must
take "the automobile and the driver as he finds them, ' 47 that the
operator of an automobile does not guarantee that he is an expert
driver and that the guest is bound to know "that his host may not
be an expert driver, '14 or that the responsibility of the host is to
use such skill as he possesses or leads the guest reasonably to
believe that he possesses. 9
It seems established, therefore, that the position of the courts
has shifted from the original theory that assumption of risk and
the volenti maxim were based on contractual relations, to the more
subtle exegesis that the doctrine is bottomed on "relational
interests" which by their very existence imply consent of the
parties to encounter a known risk. It will be noted that under
such an interpretation, the scope of the doctrine may be made to
vary with changes in the degree of interdependence among individuals and in the complexity of social organization.
III.

THE CONFUSION BETWEEN ASSUMPTION OF RIsI'z
AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

A.

THE

ImPORTANCE OF THE DISTINCTION

Judicial interpretation of the concept of assumption of risk, in
its relation to other doctrines in the law, must of course be
examined with reference to the two separate senses in which it is
461 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (1906) 157: "It may be said
that the law raises an implied assumpsit of risk on the part of the
licensee, servant, and guest, in view of the benefit which accrues to these
persons by reason of the license, employment, or entertainment. The
benefit with the corresponding detriment

to the other party, supplies

a sort of legal consideration for the implied assumpsit to bear the riskaffinity to the contract theory is manifest."
the 47
Munson v. Rupker (1923) 96 Ind. App. 15, 148 N. E. 169, aff'd 151 N.
E. 101.
48Burch, J., in Howse v. Weinrich, (1931) 133 Kan. 132, 298 Pac. 766.
See also Mayberry v. Sivey, (1877) 18 Kan. 291, in a similar case: "The
confidence accepted is an adequate consideration to support the duty."
49
Hall v. Hall, (1935) 63 S. D. 343, 258 N. W. 491, concurring opinion
of Campbell, 3. This measure of care varies somewhat from that suggested
in the early case of Siegrist v. Arnot, (1881) 10 Mo. App. 197, where it is
said that ". . . whenever a person undertakes an employment which requires
care or skill, whether he undertakes it for reward or gratuitously, a failure
to exert the measure of skill and care appropriate to such employment is
culpable negligence .. ." Note, also, the suggestion that the measure of
care required of the host must vary according to "the trust reposed" by
the guest, in Harris v. Perry & Co., [1903] 2 K. B. 219, 72 L. 3. K. B. 725,
89 L. T. 174.
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applied. When considered (as in most of the host-guest cases
regarding real property) in determining the scope of the duty of
the defendant, it may amount to little more than saying that injuries befalling the guest from specified risks which may arise
through the conduct of the host are not compensable; in short, that
as to those risks the guest is in the same position as though there
were no negligence at all, the host owing him no duty of care. In
such cases the term is not, strictly speaking, used in the sense of a
"doctrine," though courts and commentators usually so describe
it, and such designation will be followed here. Where the term
"assumption of risk" is thus used as descriptive of the duty of
the defendant, no confusion arises between the phrase and the
doctrine of contributory negligence. But where the term is used
as relating to a standard of conduct, some fault is discernible in
the plaintiff: he has "voluntarily" encountered a "known" and
"appreciated" danger. It is thus patent that these two doctrines
will overlap in many fields, and that the same type of factual
situation may be classified for treatment by the courts under either
or both of the principles. This in itself creates confusion. But
it is even more important to ascertain when each of the doctrines
has traditionally been applied to factual situations in which either
would be logically applicable. An exploration of the application
of the two theories is not, to paraphrase a trenchant remark of
Professor Powell, "negligence on stilts." As will be discussed
hereafter, rights of litigants vary as either doctrine is applied where
such principles as comparative or concurrent negligence, last clear
chance, "guest statutes," and contribution are involved.
B.

SOURCES OF THE CONFUSION

The difficulties arising from the use of the term "assumption
of risk" to indicate a specialized concept of the law, implying
certain legal rights and duties not only between the parties, but
also as to third persons, are illustrated in the cases using that
term or its equivalent in the same manner as "contributory negligence." Entirely apart from the volenti maxim and the specialized
use of the term, the words "assumption of risk" may mean that
without "voluntary" exposure of himself to a "known" or "appreciated" risk within the restriction of the rule, a party has in fact
put himself in a position of danger. In such case, the technique
available to the court in determining whether his conduct constitutes a bar to his recovery, is to classify such conduct as con-
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tributory negligence as a matter of law. Thus, relatively recent
cases in two jurisdictions have discussed the doctrines (in cases
not concerned with the master and servant relation) as being
identical. 50 In each of them the doctrine was sought to be applied
as a measure of the conduct of the plaintiff rather than with respect to the duty of the defendant. In describing the conduct of
the plaintiff, and while apparently intending to limit its effect to
such consequences as might be involved in holding it to be contributory negligence, the courts sometimes have described it in
a non-specialized sense by saying that the plaintiff "assumed the
risk,"" and courts have been slow to adopt the careful distinction
of the Missouri court that "Whenever a man does anything
dangerous, he encounters the risk; but it by no means follows that
SoMcGeever v. O'Byrne, (1919) 203 Ala. 266, 82 So. 508, " . . . as the
practical equivalent of the term 'contributory negligence' one frequently finds
in the cases the expression 'assumption of risk'" (case involving automobile
host and guest) ; Schleif v. Grigsby, (1927) 88 Cal. App. 174, 263 Pac. 255:
" . . . conceding that the theory underlying the doctrine of assumption of
risk may have application to cases outside of this particular relationship
of employment, it goes no farther than the accepted standard of ordinary
care under the circumstances. In other words, the doctrine of assumption
of risk in other cases does not absolve the wrongdoer of all blame but
places upon the party injured a higher duty if he voluntarily enters a
position of known danger." (Plaintiff, while standing in back end of open
truck, was injured by low hanging telephone wire which he knew was
there.) The latter case was approved in Valencia v. San Jose Scavenger
Co., (1937) 21 Cal. App. (2d) 469, 69 Pac. (2d) 480, in a case involving
suit by an automobile guest against a third party with whose automobile the
vehicle operated by the host collided. See also Smith v. Centennial Eureka
Mining Co., (1904) 27 Utah 307, 75 Pac. 749, an employer-employee case
holding that contributory negligence as a matter of law is established
by the volenti maxim.
-Illustrations of this practice by the courts could be multiplied. A
representative selection of the cases ought to include Senior v. Ward,
(1859) 1 El. & El. 385, 28 L. J. Q. B. 139, 32 L. T. 0. S. 252,
involving the master and servant relationship. (as to which the distinction
between the two doctrines is well considered by 1 Labatt, Master and
Servant (1913) 670, ff.) the court saying: "although the negligence of the
defendant might have been an answer to the defence that the accident was
chiefly caused by the negligence of a fellow servant, the negligence of the
plaintiff himself which materially contributed to the accident, would upon
well established principles, have deprived him of any remedy. Volenti non
fit injuria"; Franco v. Vakares, (1929) 35 Ariz. 309, 277 Pac. 812: "A
guest who rides in an automobile knowing that the driver is intoxicated
is guilty of contributory negligence. He knows, or ought to know, that a
drunken or intoxicated driver is apt to be a careless and reckless driver,
and should be held to accept an invitation to ride with such a driver at his
own risk"; Kebbee v. Connecticut Co.. (1912) 85 Conn. 641. 84 Atl. 329;
City of Columbus v. Griggs, (1901) 113 Ga. 597, 38 S. E. 953; Robinson v.
American Ice Co., (1928) 292 Pa. St. 366, 141 Atl. 244: "Where a person
assumes a position of danger when there is another safe place to which he
may go, and by reason of this position is injured, ordinarily, there can be
no recovery against another who may be negligent, the injured person's
position in itself being a contributing cause," furnishing a basis upon which
the court in Zimmer v. Little, (1940) 138 Pa. Super. 374, 10 Atl, (2d) 911
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legally speaking, he assumes that risk.""
In cases where the
term is loosely used, it might be said that the courts are in
effect holding that the defenses of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk are identical, or at least that the assumption
of risk rule is a part of the doctrine of contributory negligence.
Still other courts have confused the doctrines, at least as to
the distinction in cases involving master and servant, by suggesting that the difference is one of degree and not of kind,53 but this
theory has apparently been limited to the peculiar factual situations arising in the employer-employee relationship and appears
never to have been accepted in other fields in which the two
doctrines have been used.
C.

GENERAL ATTEMPTS TO SUGGEST DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN

ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
As it became clear that actual consent was not imperative to
invoke the volenti maxim, and before the question of a limitation
of the maxim was sufficiently presented to receive any definitive
treatment, it may well have been thought that any conduct of a
litigant other than that of a reasonably prudent man expressed
an implied consent to and assumption of a risk. It was in this
sense that the doctrine was used at an early date by a federal
apparently measured the contributory negligence of the plaintiff in his
conduct in "voluntarily assuming a position of danger in riding in the
car with knowledge of a defective door"; Lagerman v. New York Central
& H. R. Co., (1900) 53 App. Div. 283, 65 N. Y. S. 764; Kovar v. Beckius,
(1937) 133 Neb. 487, 275 N. W. 670; Joyce v. Metropolitan St. R. Co.,
(1909) 219 Mo. 344, 118 S. W. 21. See also infra cases cited at notes 91
and 105.
The most amazing case in the field is that of Loettker v. Chicago City
Ry. Co., (1909) 150 Ill. App. 69, decided after the Illinois courts had concluded that assumption of risk arose from contract only (Shoniger Co. v.
Mann, (1905) 219 II1. 242, 76 N. E. 354) in which the court said as to the
standard of conduct of a policeman hit by a trolley car assumed to be negligently operated, that "A person employed in surroundings of the character
which confronted plaintiff at his post of duty is presumed to understand the
nature and dangers of his employment when he accepts it by entering upon
the discharge of its duties, and to assume all the ordinary hazards of the
service . . . " and held that the officer was contributorily negligent as to
the street car company.
-ITinkle v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., (1908) 212 Mo. 445, 110 S. W.
1086.
-53See Johnson v. Mammoth Vein Coal Co., (1908) 88 Ark. 243, 114
S. W. 722, for a detailed discussion of this theory, citing numerous cases.
See also Barker v. Kansas City M. & 0. Ry. Co., (1913) 88 Kan. 767, 129
Pac. 1151, semble; Stogner v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., (1937) 184 S. C.
406, 192 S. E. 406, and cases cited; and Rogers v. Valk, (1913) 72 Wash.
579, 131 Pac. 231, semble.
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court" and by a number of the English judges.55 But the limitation
of the doctrine to certain specified relational interests amply illustrates that in so far as assumption of risk and contributory negligence apply to the same factual situations (and regardless of other
distinctions that may obtain between them) the doctrine of contributory negligence is the more comprehensive of the two, applying in all conditions and situations to conduct of a standard less
than that of a reasonably prudent man. At no time has it ever
been suggested that under some factual situations both doctrines
may not be equally applicable. Only in Wisconsin has it been said
that the rule regarding assumption of risk is a part of the doctrine
of contributory negligence,56 and in that state a clear distinction
between the two is now made, especially in the cases involving
the automobile guest.5 7 The two doctrines are treated together as

5
contributory negligence in the Restatement of Torts, 8 but the
"
separate nature and effect of each is emphasized. " Almost all decisions directly bearing on the subject in recent years, in what-

54See Byam v. Bullard (lass. C.C. 1852) 1 Curt. 100, Fed. Cas. No.
2,262, involving suit for violation of a patent right in 1852, where it was
stated by Judge Curtis: "As to the injury, the general rule of the common
law is 'volenti non fit injuria' and, in accordance with this maxim, no one
can maintain an action for a wrong, where he has consented or contributed
to the act of which he complains."
55
See 3 Labatt, Master and Servant (1913) 3616, and cases cited.
5
6See Compsure v. Standard Mfg. Co., (1908) 137 Wis. 155, 118 N. NV.
633, and cases cited. Note, however, that while the doctrine of assumption
of risk is considered to be a part of the contributory negligence rule,
"absolute identity for all purposes and under all circumstances . . . is
nowhere asserted." Later cases, including Keller v. City of Port Wash(1929) 200 Wis. 87, 227 N. W. 284 reach the same result.
ington,
57
1n Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., (1934) 214 Wis. 519,
252 N. W. 721, the doctrines of assumption of risk and contributory
negligence were discussed on the theory that assumption of risk was not a
part of the doctrine of contributory negligence, the court holding under a
comparative negligence statute that assumption of risk was a complete
and not a partial bar to an action against the host by the guest. This
would clearly indicate the intention of the court (not expressed in terms)
to overrule the holding in Krueger v. Krueger, (1929) 197 Wis. 588, 222
N. W. 784, holding that assumption of risk was a part of the contributory
negligence theory. See Comment, (1937) 12 Wis. L. Rev. 376.
582 Restatement, Torts (19,34).
591n making such classification of the two doctrines, the editors of the
Restatement have apparently attempted to reconcile the cases and obviate
the confusion existing in the treatment by the courts of the doctrine of assumption of risk. However, the writer has been able to discover no cases
in which the classification made therein had been adopted prior to the
publication of the Restatement, and it seems doubtful that a complete
abolition of the differences (whatever they may be considered to be)
between the effects of the two doctrines can be materially changed in view
of the quite substantial entrenchment of the volenti maxim and assumption
of risk in the decided cases. As heretofore suggested, the classification of
the two doctrines together under the head of contributory negligence
would be unexceptionable if the results reached by the courts were the
same under either doctrine. But in cases involving comparative negligence,
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ever field the doctrine has been used, have emphasized the existence of a distinction between assumption of risk and contributory
negligence, going to the nature and application of each rule. It
has long been recognized as impossible to reconcile the cases, 0
and suggestions as to the nature of the distinction have been
many and varied, only a few of which can be suggested here. It
has been stated that the essence of contributory negligence is carelessness and that of assumption of risk is venturesomeness ;61
that the doctrine of assumption of risk62 or the volenti maxim6 3
involves cases where deliberation precedes action, whereas contributory negligence implies action without deliberation; or that
the "practical difference of the two ideas is in the degree of their
proximity to the particular harm" ;-" that contributory negligence
is conduct which contributes to cause a particular accident which
occurs, while assumption of risk involves voluntarily incurring
the risk of an accident which may or may not occur, and which a
person may be careful to avoid after starting ;65 that the assumption of risk changes the duty of the defendant to "one of imperfect obligation no longer recognized by law";66 that assumption
of risk exists only as to apparent dangers when the servant accepts
employment ;67 that assumption of risk relates to intelligent acquiescence in a known danger while contributory negligence relates to
conduct ;' or that assumption of risk goes to the contract relarights of infants, joint tort feasors, the doctrine of last clear chance,
guest statutes, and other concepts, the differences between the effect of the
doctrine of assumption of risk and that of contributory negligence have been
so canalized (whether or not for socially justifiable ends) that the
expediency of an attempt to so restate the doctrine may be questioned.
'JuThe first case in which it may be conjectured that the distinction was
recognized is that of Gould v. Oliver (1837) 4 Bing. N. Cas. 134, in
which Tridal, C. J., suggests that " . . . no one can maintain an action for

a wrong, where he has consented or contributed to the act which occasioned
his loss."
(Italics supplied.)
1
;3Hunn
v. Windsor Hotel Co., (1937) 119 W. Va. 215, 193 S. E. 57.
'-Edwards v. Kirk, (1940) 227 Ia. 684, 288 N. W. 875, citing Cooley on
Torts, Throckmorton's Student Edition, (1930) 658.
,,:,Thomas v. Quartermaine, (1887) 182 Q. B. D. 696, per Bowen, L. J.
"'Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R. & P. Ry. Co., (1907) 205 U. S. 12, 27 Sup.
Ct. 407, 51 L. Ed. 681, per Holmes, J.
"1Warner v. Markoe, (1937) 171 Md. 351, 189 At. 260; statement
reaffirmed in Gordon v. Maryland State Fair, (1938) 174 Md. 466, 199 AtI.
519.
1161Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (1906) 169.
' 7Patrum v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., (1914) 259 Mo. 109, 168 S. W.
622.
'J'Wheeler v. Tyler, (1915) 129 Minn. 206, 152 N. XV. 137; Dean v. St.
Louis Woodenware Works, (1904) 106 Mo. App. 179, 80 S. W. 292. See
also Lee v. St. Louis M. & S. E. R. Co., (1905) 112 Mo. App. 386, 87
S. V. 12; Alko-Nak Coal Co. v. Barton, (1923) 88 Okla. 212, 212 Pac.
591; and Miller v. White Bronze Monument Co., (1908) 141 Ia. 701, 118
N. W. 518, 18 Ann. Cas. 957, and note.
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tionship while contributory negligence goes to conduct. 9 Frequently the more general "distinction" is made that the doctrine
of assumption of risk arises from contract, while contributory
negligence arises from tort."'
A very general way of explaining the distinction between the
two is to suggest, as did Professor Warren in 1895, that "It may
be consistent with due care to incur a known danger voluntarily
and deliberately." 7' Almost without exception, the distinctions
sought to be made, and the definitions enunciated, arose out of
cases involving the master and servant relationship.
The difficulty, of course, with all of the distinctions suggested
above is that they are neither complete nor exclusive. They suggest, but do not define. Especially is this true when the "distinctions" relate to subjective qualities in the actor. A differentiation
between the two doctrines, based on plaintiff's apprehension and
knowledge of danger, can be supported only by conclusions of
law as to his mental condition under stated circumstances, since
such a differentiation is impossible of proof, and it would seem
more definitive to describe such circumstances and establish the
legal consequences of such conduct without the interposition of a
highly attenuated theory founded on mental qualities incapable of
objective proof. 'Moreover, a differentiation between the two
theories (and the consequences of conduct under them) based on
a distinction between deliberation and nondeliberation or the
proximity of the plaintiff's conduct to the harm seems to reveal
no socially justifiable variance in theory. To say that assumption
of risk arises from venturesomeness is to disregard the entire
6
9Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Bossert, (1909) 44 Ind. App. 245,
87 N.0 E. 158, and cases cited.
7 St. Louis Cordage Co. v. Miller, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1903) 126 Fed. 495;
Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Ponn, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1911) 191 Fed. 682;
Swanson v. Miami Home Milk Producers' Ass'n, (1934) 117 Fla. 110, 157
So. 415; Swick v. Aitna Portland Cement Co., (1907) 147 Mich. 454, 111 N.
'W. 110; Choctaw 0. & G. R. Co. v. O'Nesky, (1905) 6 Ind. T. 180, 90
S. W. 300; Wintermute v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nay. Co., (1921) 98
Or. 431, 194 Pac. 420; Montgomery v. Seaboard Airline Ry., (1906) 73
S. C. 503, 53 S.E. 987. But cf. Rase v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R.
Co., (1909) 107 Minn. 260, 120 N. W. 360, where it is quite properly
suggested that assumption of risk cannot rest on contract alone; that both
defenses are equally peculiar to the law of tort, and that both are usually
from conduct.
implied
-1Warren, Volenti non Fit Injuria, (1908) 8 Harv. L. Rev. 461. For
courts expressing this distinction, see, e. g., Porter v. Louisville & N. R.
Co., (1918) 201 Ala. 469, 78 So. 375; Lively v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.,
(1924) 115 Kan. 784, 225 Pac. 103; Westcott v. Chicago Great Western
R. Co., (1923) 157 Minn. 325, 196 N. W. 272; and the standard case cited
to support this point of view, Narramore v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry.
Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1899) 96 Fed 298.
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background of the doctrine in its application to employees unwilling to encounter a risk but forced to do so by economic pressure;
and in any event venturesomeness is clearly classifiable as contributor, negligence when the risk taken would not have been
encountered by a reasonably prudent man.
Further, a description that contributory negligence involves
"lack of care and hence the absence of deliberate choice" ignores
the concept that one driving at an excessive rate of speed, for instance, does so by deliberate choice and still may be guilty of a
lack of care. And the distinction based on the theory that contributory negligence relates only to an accident which occurs seems too
tenuous to support differentiation, for in each case the legal fault
of the plaintiff is the measure of the right of recovery. And a
"duty" of the defendant to the plaintiff ought be said to exist
or not exist; if it is an "imperfect obligation," the duty does not
exist at all. To say that contributory negligence relates to conduct and that assumption of risk relates to intelligent acquiescence
in a known risk, while maintaining that there is a distinction between the two theories, is in itself a contradiction in terms, for
"intelligent acquiescence" is in itself "conduct," and intelligent
acquiescence in a known risk is in many cases considered as contributory negligence. To say that assumption of risk goes to the
contract relationship while contributory negligence goes to the conduct of the plaintiff is to overlook more recent developments in
the application of the rule which have quite well established that
the doctrine of assumption of risk arises from "relational," not
merely "contractual" interests of the parties; and in any event,
the doctrine of assumption of risk has often been conceived to
arise from the "conduct" of the plaintiff, which forms the basis
for the "contractual" or "consensual" fictions upon which courts
have said that the contract of employment is the basis for the application of the rule.
Similar objections may be raised to the distinction that assumption of risk arises from contract and contributory negligence
arises from tort; but the additional observation ought be made
that a sterile classification of the effect of conduct as tortious or
contractual does little to establish a logical or socially significant
line of delimitation between the two doctrines. Even Professor
\\Varren's distinction between the two on the basis that there
must be a difference because "It may be consistent with due care
to incur a known danger voluntarily and deliberately" seems
limited in its application to the master-servant cases, and the dis-
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tinction has been quite emasculated by the courts in suggesting that
where an individual uses due care to avoid a known danger encountered for a socially justifiable purpose he is not in fact volens,
an element generally considered indispensable in the application
of the maxim.7 2 If the risk were encountered for a purpose not
socially justifiable, it would seem logically correct (though the
cases have not put it thus) to classify assumption of risk as merely
a part of the doctrine of contributory negligence as done in the
Restatement 73-- although the effect of application of the doctrine
of assumption of risk has often been to limit the right of the plaintiff much more extensively than that of contributory negligence.
Still other courts have emphasized the distinction between the
doctrines without reference to essential dissimilarity in the nature
of the defenses, but rather by reference to the requirements of the
doctrine of assumption of risk that there be a voluntary assumption of a known and appreciated peril. 74 A differentiation based
solely on such a distinction seems inadequate in view of the many
factual situations in which one voluntarily encountering a known
danger has been held guilty of contributory negligence.
D.

THE DISTINCTION THAT ASSUMPTION OF RISK RELATES
TO THE "DUTY" OF THE DEFENDANT, WTHILE CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE RELATES TO A "DEFENSE" AGAINST THE

PLAINTIFF
Other attempts to create a more critical and definitive differentiation between the two doctrines have resulted in the quite gen72As to the theory that one may not be "volens" in accepting a socially
justifiable risk, see cases and materials cited at notes 176, 184-192, infra
and text.
733 Restatement of Torts, (1934)
Sec. 466. Vhile the decided cases
do not support the analysis of the Restatement, the classification therein
seems justified because of the inability of the courts to distinguish between
the two
doctrines.
74
No attempt has been made to collect the authorities on this point,
which is evident from the decisions themselves concerning such requirements.
The ideology suggested is followed in many of the cases cited in notes 177 to
221 infra, dealing with recognition of the requirements of "voluntary"
assumption of a "known" and "appreciated" danger. The concept is
exemplified in Buckingham v. Eagle Warehouse & Storage Co.. (1919) 189
App. Div. 760, 179 N. Y. S. 218, where one was injured in riding on a
trailer attached to an auto truck: "It cannot be disputed that in voluntarily
and needlessly riding on the trailer the plaintiff assumed the added risks
due to such method of transportation. As to such risks, such assumption
is often considered as equivalent to contributory negligence .... However it
seems to me that assumption of risk and contributory negligence are not
the same thing, although they may have the same effect on a plaintiff's right
to recover. Assumption of risk is the voluntary acceptance of a hazard, and
under the doctrine 'volenti non fit injuria' one has no cause for action
for injury due to a hazard so assumed. ..."
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erally accepted concept that the doctrine of assumption of risk
relates to the "duty" of the defendant toward the plaintiff, while
contributory negligence relates to a "defense" of the defendant,
where it is conceded that a "duty" has been violated.
In order properly to examine the use of the "duty" concept,
it may be advisable to outline the factual situations in which it
has been held applicable. The designation of the doctrine as one
including the duty of the defendant was made when the earlier
cases concerning master and servant were decided in England,
although some of the cases seemed to regard the defense as one
which arose because the voluntary action of the servant in exposing himself to risk constituted a bar to an action against the negligent defendant, and even Labatt conceived that the proper view
was that the servant was in effect barred by the defense of contributory negligence,-,: notwithstanding that almost all courts had conceded that a distinction existed between the two.76 Most courts

denominated the distinction as arising from the fact that while
assumption of risk operated as a limitation on the duty of the
defendant, contributory negligence operated as a defense by
the defendant in a suit for violation of a duty. 77

In host-guest

cases relating to the use of land, the theory that assumption of
risk is founded on a limitation of the duty of the defendant is
well established-better established, perhaps, than in the other
areas in which the doctrine is used. The term is largely used
there in describing the "duty" of the landowner toward one coming on the land, as distinguished from the "conduct" of the guest.
Hence the uncomfortable division of the assumption of risk doctrine into two theories respectively relating to policy limitations
on the responsibility which ought to attach to the host, and the
awareness of the guest of peril and a continuing course of conduct
753 Labatt, Master and Servant (1913) 3623-3626, and cases cited.
,Ibid.
77
For decisions of English courts, see ibid. See also the earliest Scotch
case on the subject, refusing to apply the doctrine and apparently considering the doctrine as going to the duty of the defendant. Sword v. Cameron,
(1839) 1 Dunl. (Ct. of Sess.) 493. As to American courts adopting the
"duty" theory see, e. g., Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. v. Nixon, (1926) 271
U. S. 218, 36 Sup. Ct. 495, 70 L. Ed. 914; Dempsey v. Sawyer (1901) 95
Me. 295, 49 At. 1035; 0'Maley v. South Boston Gaslight Co., (1893) 158
Mass. 135, 32 N. E. 1119, 47 L. R. A. 161, and cases cited; Hotchkin v.
Erdrich, (1906) 214 Pa. St. 460, 63 Ad. 1035; Hunn v. Windsor Hotel Co.,
(1937) 193 S. E. 57, 119 W. Va. 215. See, also, as to the theory that the
employer was not negligent and that no duty rested upon him, Maloney v.
Florence & C. C. R. Co., (1907) 39 Colo. 384, 89 Pac. 649, and Kentucky
Lbr. Co. v. Nicholson, (1914) 157 Ky. 812, 164 S. W. 84.
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with such understanding, has in part been obviated. 78 In cases
where the guest is rightfully on the premises of the owner or
occupier and the host is under a duty to use reasonable care for
his safety, however, the doctrine of assumption of risk is sometimes used to prevent recovery by the guest. In such cases, the
conduct of the plaintiff and its relation to the doctrine of assumption of risk comes into importance, and such cases for the most
part deal with the doctrine as a limitation of the duty of the defendant,7 9 thus creating further confusion.

Other cases relating to the vehicular guest consider the doctrine as relating to the duty of the operator of the vehicle. Some
cases appear to reach the conclusion without detailed discussion
of the distinction, 0 while others merely point out that the defendant may admit his own negligence and the plaintiff's lack of contributory negligence and still prevail;81 that the limitation of
duty arises in the same manner as in the master and servant
cases ;82 or that the duty is limited by a transfer of the host-guest
78See 1 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (1906) 155: "Where
mischief happens to a trespasser by reason of the defective or dangerous
condition of the premises upon which he trespasses, he is very properly
held to assume the risk, and no recovery can be had against the keeper
of those premises. As it is commonly and somewhat more artificially put,
the implied duty to prevent harm from unsafe premises does not exist in
favor of a trespasser." For one of the earlier English cases, see Gautret
v. Egerton, (1867) L. R. 2 C. P. 371, 36 L. J. C. P. 191, 15 W. R. 638
limiting the duty of the defendant toward a licensee. In the basic case on
this subject, Ilott v. Wilkes (1820) 3 Barn. & Aid. 304, the duty of a
landowner defendant toward a trespasser was so limited. As will be noted
hereafter, the entire question of the liability of an owner or occupier of
property toward those coming on the property with or without permission
has been discussed on the theory that the one coming on the premises
"assumes the risk" of certain dangers; that is, the duty of the defendant
owner or occupier toward him is limited. See 3 Restatement of Torts
(1934) Sec. 333, using the term in this sense, and notes 127 to 142 and
text infra.
79 See Note, (1936) 21 Iowa L. Rev. 650, 651, and cases cited. The
problem is often presented in cases involving injury to a patron at an
amusement enterprise, and the theory adopted by the courts in such cases
usually relates to the limitation of the duty of the defendant. See also
notes on this subject at (1936) 17 B. U. L. Rev. 485, and (1937) 14
N. Y.8 U. L. Q. 540.
oCf., e. g., Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Needham, (C.C.A. 4th Cir.
1917) 244 Fed. 146, and Carpenter v. Thomas, (1931) 164 Wash. 583, 3
Pac. (2d) 1001. The doctrine was also so treated in Dann v. Hamilton,
[1939] 1 K. B. 509, 55 T. L. R. 297, 108 L. J. K. B. 255, 160 L. T. 433,
where Lord Asquith refused to apply it.
81E. g., Freedman v. Hurwitz, (1933) 116 Conn. 283, 164 Atl. 647.
82
Biersach v. Wechselberg, (1931) 206 Wis. 113, 238 N. W. 905. The
source of the doctrine of assumption of risk in automobile cases is discussed
in connection with the original use of the doctrine in the master-servant
cases in notes 112 to 126 infra, and text. As to the prior holding of the
Wisconsin court relating the doctrine to the real property cases, however,
see note 83 infra.
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concept from the real property cases to the motor vehicle cases."3
The obvious criticism of this distinction is that while in some
cases the term assumption of risk is used to suggest a limitation
of what is generally considered to be the "duty" of the defendant
(as in saying that a licensee "assumes the risk" of dangers on
the premises of the host which the host ought to but did not in
fact know existed), in most cases the term is in fact used to designate legal fault of the plaintiff, arising from his "conduct" in voluntarily encountering a known and appreciated danger, which is in
practice and effect a "defense" to the action. The attempted distinction is illusory, for it propounds no standard through which
it may be determined whether "conduct" of the plaintiff in specific
circumstances shall be considered as a "defense," or a limitation
of the "duty" of the defendant, or both.
A further difficulty with the distinction lies in the fact that
it is founded upon the mental state of the parties; that the duty
of the defendant is limited because the plaintiff knew and appreciated the danger. The refinement has been carried even further
in some of the cases relating to the automobile guest: not only
is the duty of the defendant limited by the plaintiff's state of
mind, but by the state of mind of the defendant as well; that is,
if the host is incompetent and does not know he is incompetent,
he has no "duty" not to be incompetent; on the other hand, if he is
incompetent and knows that he is so, he has a "duty" not to be
incompetent. Such refinements make the distinction complicated
in theory and difficult of application in practice.84 A number of cases
have held that the doctrine of assumption of risk does not apply
where the plaintiff undertakes a risk for a socially justifiable purpose.Y Ought it be said that the "duty" of a drunken host is any
more or any less whether the plaintiff guest is going to a beer parlor
for his thirst or a hospital for his health? To put the question is
to answer it. No more ought it be said in the cases involving a
pedestrian crossing a dangerous way that the "duty" of the governmental subdivision responsible for the maintenance of roads
ought to vary between those who find it more expedient to use
a highway because it is a shorter route to the hospital and those
who find it a shorter route to a saloon.
Cf., e. g., O'Shea v. Lavoy, (1921) 175 Wis. 456, 185 N. W. 525, and
White v. McVicker, (1933) 216 Iowa 90, 246 N. W. 385. The source of
the doctrine relating to the cases involving vehicular travel as arising from
the host-guest concept in real property cases is discussed in notes 146 to
162 infra, and text.
84Eisenhut v. Eisenhut, (1933) 212 Wis. 467, 248 N. W. 440.
-5See cases cited infra notes 176, 184 to 192, and text.
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A further difficulty arises from this indeterminate use of the
word "duty" as it relates to differentiation between contributory
negligence and assumption of risk. Legal responsibility for conduct-the true measure of "duty"-ought for many reasons suggested by Dean Green,8 6 be a question for the court. Yet the determination of whether the conduct of the plaintiff has been such
as to relieve the defendant of his "duty" is one which has normally
been decided by a jury,"7 except of course where the weight of
the evidence is conclusive, in which case, as with the doctrine of
contributory negligence, the court determines it as a matter of
law. Moreover, accurate measurement of the "duty" of the defendant is here made impossible, since the conduct and the mental
condition of the plaintiff determine the application of the doctrine
by the jury, and confusion of the jury must inevitably result from
the instructions of the court. "An act which changes its quality
completely, according as the servant is or is not aware of the
physical consequences which it may entail, is, we think, a conception altogether too subtle or refined to be comprehended by the
average juror."' 8
It has heretofore been suggested that the doctrine arises out
of "relational" interests. This leaves the scope of the "duty" to
be determined by the relations of the parties. The result is that
there are in effect almost as many "duties," with consequent
qualifications in factual situations, as there are decisions in courts
of last resort. Moreover, it seems clear that normally the facts
justifying the application of the assumption of risk doctrine must
be pleaded and proved by the defendant.89 If assumption of
risk goes to the "duty" of the defendant, it seems contrary to
8GIn discussing the necessity for having rules of conduct and duties
definitely stated by the courts, with respect to establishing proximate
causation, Dean Green in his Rationale of Proximate Cause, (1927) 68, 69
and 70, -suggested: "But it is inconceivable that rules relied on in other
classes of wrongs should have boundaries and limits while here they
should not, or that a court is required in other cases to define such limits
while here the court has no such duty . . .the determination of whether a
hazard falls within the protection of a rule of law calls for [profound
considerations] .. .it calls for all of those considerations involved in the
lawmaking process whether it be by judicial or legislative sanction. How
a court shall know the law-how it shall know when an interest is
protected, or protected against a specific risk by a certain rule-is the most
comprehensive of inquiries involved in the administration of justice." If it
is sought to establish the "duty" of the defendant, by reference to the
doctrine of assumption of risk, it would seem that these considerations ought
to 'apply.
57
See infra Section VI, subsection d.
883 Labatt, Master and Servant, (1913) 3636.
See Prosser, Torts, (1941) 376, 377 and cases cited.
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established practice to make him assume the burden of disproving
it, for the existence of the "duty" in all other branches of tort law
is a matter upon which the burden of proof rests with the plaintiff.

E.

ILLUSTRATIONS OF EXISTING CONFUSION

A compilation of the decisions concerning the application of
the concepts of assumption of risk and contributory negligence to
substantially similar factual situations reveals a "veritable chaos of
conflicting precedents." In the master and servant relationships,
of course, all ordinary risks of the employment are assumed by
the employee.," But as to extraordinary risks-where there is a
breach of duty owed by the master to the servant-and the
servant "voluntarily" assumes the risk of injury by continuing
in the employment in the face of a "known" and "appreciated"
danger, the application of the two rules is not clear. "The difficulties of the inquiry begin when an attempt is made to extract from
the reports a consistent and scientific theory as to the apportionment of the territory between the defenses based on the servant's
assumption of the risk and on his want of care," 91 and it is clear
that in this field courts have often used9 2both doctrines to apply
to substantially similar factual situations.
In cases involving the automobile guest, substantially similar
factual situations have been treated by application of both principles interchangeably in different courts 93 and even in the same
jurisdiction.94 Courts have very generally held that one accompanying a driver who proceeds at an excessive rate of speed,
without protest of the guest, assumes the risk of injury, and that
he has been guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of
law."5 Both theories have been applied in cases which turn upon
,oSee textual discussion and cases cited in 2 Labatt, Master and
Servant, (1913) 3092.
','Labatt, Assumption of Risks and Contributory Negligence, (1897) 31
Am.L. Rev. 667, 668.
V'2Ibid, passim.
3Infra, notes 94-107 and text
-"4Cf.,e. g., Kurz v. Kuhn, (1929) 198 Wis. 172, 223 N. W. 412, with
Eisenhut v. Eisenhut (1933) 212 Wis. 467, 248 N. W. 440, and Poneitowcki
(1929) 200 Wis. 504, 228 N. W. 126.
v. Harres,
' 5Much cited cases in which the doctrine of assumption of risk is
discussed in this connection include McKinley v. Dalton, (1932) 128 Cal.
App. 298, 17 Pac. (2d) 160; Miller v. Stevens, (1934) 63 S.D. 10, 256 N.
152; and Krause v. Hall, (1928) 195 Wis. 565, 217 N. W. 290. Other
WV.
courts, however, have refused to hold that this conduct constitutes a basis
for application of the doctrine, considering such conduct as contributory
negligence: New York Indemnity Co. vs. Ewen, (1927) 221 Ky. 114, 298
S. W. 182; Norfleet v. Hall, (1933) 204 N. C. 573, 169 S.E. 143; and Buick
Automobile Co. v. Weaver, (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) 163 S. W. 594. A
great number of cases have held that such conduct constitutes contributory
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the question of the known sleepiness of the host,"6 and in those
involving the so-called "range of vision" rule, requiring that
the defendant be able to stop his car within the range of the assured clear distance ahead.97 A similar situation is presented when
a passenger is injured by reason of riding in an exposed position
on a motor vehicle. In such cases some courts have held that
plaintiff's contributory negligence really involved assumption of
risk of the increased peril ;"' others have based their decisions on
the doctrine of contributory negligence alone, 9 ' while still others
have considered the problem as purely one of assumption of
risk. 100 A similar division of the courts has occurred in cases
negligence, without discussing the application of the assumption of risk
doctrine. The most adequate compilation of such cases seems to be
arranged in the American Digest System under the topic, Automobiles, at
Key Number 224 (5) and (6).
96Generally cited cases discussing the doctrine of assumption of risk
in such cases include Freedman v. Hurwitz, (1933) 116 Conn. 283, 164 At.
647; Krueger v. Krueger, (1929) 197 Wis. 588, 222 N. W. 784; and Markovich v. Schlafke, (1939) 230 Wis. 639, 284 N. W. 516. A compilation of
cases on this subject, dealing with the problem as one of contributory
negligence, may be found in 86 A. L. R. 1147, and annotations supplementary thereto, relating to the conduct of the driver. As to the effect of
the acquiescence of the guest as contributory negligence or assumption of
risk, see the cases collected in the Third and Fourth Decennial Digests and
(5) and (6).
General
7 Digest under the topic Automobiles, Key Number 224
9 As to application of this theory by denominating it as assumption of
risk, see Kovar v. Beckius, (1937) 133 Neb. 487, 275 N. W. 670; Walker
v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., (1934) 214 Wis. 519, 252 N. WV.721, 92 A.
L. R. 680; and Helgestad v. North, (1940) 233 "Wis.349, 289 N. W. 822.
As in the other factual situations preceding, the great majority of the
courts have held that inability to stop within the range of vision is, as to
the host, contributory negligence. See cases collected in 37 A. L. R. 587,
with annotations cited and supplementary annotations, relating to the
conduct of the driver as contributory negligence, and the cases collected
in American Digest System under the topic, Automobiles, Key Number 224
(5) and (6), holding that the conduct of the guest under such circumstances
is contributory negligence.
98Stout v. Lewis, (1929) 11 La. App. 503, 123 So. 346. This approach
was adopted also in the cases of McMahon v. Hamilton, (1928) 204 Cal.
228, 267 Pac. 546; Vandell v. Sanders, (1931) 85 N. H. 143, 155 Atl. 193;
Robinson v. American Ice Co. (1928) 292 Pa. St. 366. 141 Atl. 244; and
Verrone v. Rhode Island S. R. Co., (1905) 27 R. I. 370, 62 Atl. 512.
99See cases cited in 80 A. L. R. 553, annotations cited and supplementary annotations, and the cases 'collected in the Third and Fourth Decennial Digests and General Digest under the topic, Automobiles, Key Number
224 (7), especially Kryger v. Panaszy, (1937) 123 Conn. 353, 195 Atl.
795, and Murphy v. Omwake, (1930) 14 Pac. D. & C. 179.
100LMcGeever v. O'Byrne, (1919) 203 Ala. 266, 82 So. 508; Graff v.
United Railroads of San Francisco, (1918) 178 Cal. 171, 172 Pac. 603;
Gornstein v. Priver, (1923) 64 Cal. App. 249, 221 Pac. 396; Strong v. Olsen,
(1925) 74 Cal. App. 518, 241 Pac. 107; Elliott v. Coreil (La. App. 1935)
158 So. 698; Moody v. Springfield St. R. Co., (1902) 182 Mass. 158,
65 N. E. 29; Burns v. Boston El. R. Co., (1903) 183 Mass. 96, 66 N. E.
418; Guile v. Greenberg, (1934) 192 Minn. 548, 257 N. W. 649; Paquin v.
St. L. & S. R. Co., (1901) 90 Mo. App. 118; Nies v. Brooklyn H. R. Co.,
(1902) 68 App. Div. 259, 74 N. Y. S. 41; and Wiese v. Polzer, (1933) 212
Wis. 337, 248 N. W. 113.
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involving the conduct of one trying to board a vehicle in motiono1°
and the decisions are also in confusion as to the application of
the respective doctrines in cases involving overcrowding of passengers in an automobile. 1' 2
The standard reference made by commentators to illustrate
the confusion in the application of the two doctrines in automobile cases is to defenses arising when the guest accepts the hospitality of an intoxicated automobile host. Although most of the
courts have discussed this conduct as contributory negligence,03
others have concluded that it comes within the doctrine of assumption of risk."" The Kentucky court has enunciated the doctrine
that since the conduct of the guest shows contributory negligence,
'"1 Contributory negligence and assumption of risk considered as the
same doctrine: Joyce v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., (1909) 219 Mo. 344,
118 S. W. 21; conduct considered as evincing assumption of risk: Gunn v.
United Rys. Co. of St. Louis (1917) 270 Mo. 517, 193 S. XV. 814, rev'g
(1913) 177 Mo. App. 512, 160 S. W. 540, citing Booth, Street Railways,
(1892) sec. 336; Murphy v. North Jersey St. Ry. Co., (1904) 71 N. J. L. 5,
58 Atl. 1018; conduct considered as contributory negligence: Harrison v.
Graham, (Tenn. App. 1937) 107 S. W. (2d) 517; Osborne v. Texas
Traction Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) 134 S. V. 816.
-'-'Cf.,
e. q., McIntyre v. Pope, (1937) 326 Pa. St. 172, 191 Ad. 607,
holding such conduct to be contributory negligence, with Hawthorne v.
Gunn, (1932) 123 Cal. App. 462, 11 Pac. (2d) 411, and Kalamian v.
Kalamian, (1927) 107 Conn. 86, 139 Atl. 635, suggesting that both doctrines
may be applicable in a proper case. See also cases collected in Third and
Fourth Decennial Digests and General Digest under the topic Automobiles,
Key Number 224 (2).
- 'Franco v. Vakares, (1929) 35 Ariz. 309, 277 Pac. 812; Keller v. White,
(1927) 173 Ark. 885, 293 S. W. 1017; Sparks v. Chitwood Motor Co.,
(1936) 192 Ark. 743, 94 S.W. (2d) 359; Lewis v. Chitwood Motor Co.,
(1938) 196 Ark. 86, 115 S. W. (2d) 1072; Lynn v.Goodwin, (1915) 170
Cal. 112, 148 Pac. 927; Johnson v.So. Pac. Co. (1930) 105 Cal. App. 340,
288 Pac. 81; Yates v. Brazelton. (1930) 108 Cal. App. 533, 291 Pac. 695;
Connor v. Johnson, (1933) 132 Cal. App. 449, 22 P. (2d) 760; McMahon v.
Schindler, (1941) 38 Cal. App. (2d) 642, 102 Pac. (2d) 378; Powell v.
Berry, (1917) 145 Ga. 696, 89 S. E. 753; French v. Tebben, (1933) 53
Idaho 701, 27 Pac. (2d) 475; Beaserman v. Hines, (1920) 210 Ill. Ap~p. 606;
Livaudais v. Black, (1930) 13 La. App. 345, 127 So. 129; Richard v.
Canning. (La. App. 1935) 158 So. 598; Clinton v. West Monroe, (La. App.
1939) 187 So. 561; Richards v. Neault, (1926) 126 Me. 17, 135 At. 524;
Bubar v. Fisher, (1935) 134 Me. 10, 180 Atl. 923; McKeon v. Iverson,
(1921) 47 N. D. 132. 180 N. W. 805; Schwartz v. Johnson, (1926) 152
Tenn. 586, 280 S.XV1.
32: Hicks v. Herbert, (1938) 173 Tenn. 1, 113 S.W.
(2d) 1107; Jensen v. Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co., (1925) 133 Wash. 208,
233 Pac. 635; Wayson v. Rainier Taxi Co., (1925) 136 Wash. 274; 239 Pac.
559; Trotter v. Bullock. (1928) 148 Wash. 516, 269 Pac. 825; Wold v.
Gardner, (1932) 167 Vash. 191, 8 Pac. (2d) 975. Under circumstances
suggested in the cases, the decisions vary as to the conditions under which
such 1 conduct will in fact be contributory negligence as a matter of law.
"'McGeever v. O'Byrne, (1919) 213 Ala. 266, 82 So. 508; Nardone v.
Milton Fire Dist., (1941) 261 App. Div. 717, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 489;
Biersach v. Wechselberg, (1931) 206 Wis. 113, 238 N. W. 905; Markovich
v. Schlafke, (1939) 230 Wis. 639, 284 N. W. 516; Schubring v. Weggen,
(1940) 234 Wis. 517, 291 N. W. 788.
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he thereby assumed the risk of injuryO'' and the Connecticut
court has applied the two doctrines alternately to substantially
the same factual situations." The general confusion between the
two rules led the California court, on the basis of a prior holding
that one riding with an intoxicated driver was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, to say that one "assumed
07
the risk" of riding with a (literally) one armed driver.
The ultimate result of the cases and comments concerning the
distinction between assumption of risk and contributory negligence
is to demonstrate that as yet neither logical nor practical differentiation between the two has been established, and the inadequacy
of the distinctions sought to be drawn between the two doctrines
is emphasized by the indiscriminate application of either doctrine
to substantially identical factual conditions. Whether such a distinction can be made requires an examination of the development
of the doctrine of assumption of risk in various factual situations
and an investigation of traditional prerequisites for the application
of the doctrine: that there be a "voluntary" encounter with a
"known" and "appreciated" peril.
IV.

SOURCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE IN

SPECIFIC

FIELDS

The source of the doctrine is shrouded in confusion. In view
of the inaccessibility of the cases, questions concerning the proper
application of the rule have doubtless seldom been squarely presented or adequately briefed for the consideration of the trial and
appellate courts, and the nature of the record presented on appeal
may have limited judicial analysis of the doctrine still further.
' 0oWinston's Adm'r v. City of Henderson, (1918) 179 Ky. 220, 200 S. W.
330; Archer v. Bourne, (1927) 222 Ky. 268, 300 S. W. 604; Toppass v.
Perkins' Adm'x, (1937) 268 Ky. 186, 104 S. W. (2d) 423; Rennolds'
Adm'x v. Waggener, (1938) 271 Ky. 300, 111 S. W. (2d) 647; Mahin's
Adm'r v. McClellan, (1940) 279 Ky. 595, 131 S. W. (2d) 478. The
rationalia of these cases is explained in the case of Poole v. Lutz &
Schmidt, (1938) 273 Ky. 586, 117 S. W. (2d) 575, relating to the connection between assumption of risk and contributory negligence in cases involving suit by the servant for injuries suffered through the negligence of an
independent contractor, suit being brought against the independent
contractor, in which the court suggested that where the term is used
outside the relation of master and servant and is equivalent to contributory
negligence: "It is always the duty of one to exercise ordinary care for his
own safety, and facts showing that he did not may also prove that, in
its broader sense, he assumed the risk, that is, that he took the chance of
being hurt."
loGCf. Dickerson v. Connecticut Co., (1922) 98 Conn. 87, 118 Atl. 518,
with 07
Fitzpatrick v. Cinitis, (1927) 107 Conn. 91, 139 At. 639.
Doggett v. Lacey (1932) 121 Cal. App. 395, 9 P. (2d) 257.
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As has been noted, the doctrine arose out of the maxim "volenti
non fit injuria,"10 and subsequent interpretations of the maxim
as including "consensual" or "relational" interests as well as
those purely contractual."09
A.

MIASTER AND SERVANT

As heretofore indicated, the term has been used in cases involving master and servant to indicate a limitation on the "duty"
of the defendant (in that the servant "assumes the risk" of the
ordinary dangers of the employment, whether known or unknown
to him) as well as to establish legal fault in the "conduct" of the
plaintiff (as where the defendant creates a known dangerous condition which the plaintiff willingly encounters).11' Under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act, the doctrine received considerable attention in the early transportation cases, and although
statutory enactments have very generally circumscribed the doctrine, it remains at least historically significant.",
Analogies between the rule as applied in master-servant and
automobile guest cases readily appear. It has often been said
that the duty of the employer is not to increase by negligence the
dangers (other than "ordinary risks") to which the employee subjects himself and which it is said he assumes," 2 and the standard
of care of the operator of an automobile to his guest (upon which
it is said that other risks are assumed by the guest) is that the
host owes him the duty not to increase the normal dangers incident
to the transportation,"" the rule sometimes being stated that the
114
guest does not assume the risk of the negligence of the host.
" 5"Supra note 32, and text.
1'6Supra,
notes 36 to 49, and text.
"10 The analysis is accepted among all commentators. See Prosser,
Torts, (1941) 379, 513; 2 Labatt, Master and Servant, (1913) 3092, 3095;
Harper, Torts, (1933) 291 ; 1 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (1906)
166; and cases cited in accord. See also supra notes 90, 91 and text.
"'See supra, notes 34 and 35. Under the Act, the fellow servant rule
was abolished; contributory negligence was a pro tanto defense depending
on causation, but the defense of assumption of risk was retained to the
employer except in cases involving violations of safety statutes by him.
It was, of course, necessary to show negligence on the part of the employer
in order to justify a recovery against him. In 1939, as indicated at note 34
supra, the defense of assumption of risk was abolished altogether.
1123 Labatt, Master and Servant, (1913) 3110, 3111, 3143, and especially
3164; Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, (1906) 20 Harv. L. Rev. 30;
Hough v. Texas and P. R. Co., (1879) 110 U. S.213, 25 L. Ed. 612.
"While this statement of the rule is generally accepted, there is some
deviation from it. See notes 159 to 184 infra, and text.
114E. g., Marks v. Dorkin, (1927) 105 Conn. 521, 136 AtI. 83, and
Williamson v. Fitzgerald, (1931) 16 Cal. App. 79, 2 Pac. (2d) 201.
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It has generally been conceded that the doctrine is inapplicable
in cases involving master and servant where the servant has protested against an unsafe condition, and the master promises to
remedy the defect, 115 just as it is held in the automobile cases
that a protest by the guest against misconduct of the host will
operate to relieve him from the application of the doctrine"-in
each case the consent implied by law is counteracted by the actual
showing of non-consent by the parties. But where the damage
to the plaintiff arises from the concurrence of two factors under
the control of the defendant, the risk of only one of which was
assumed by him, it has been suggested that in the master-servant
relationship cases the employee might recover for his damage, 17
while the contrary has been asserted in cases involving the automobile guest."' It has been generally accepted in each field that it
is immaterial whether the danger was known when the plaintiff
entered the relation, or arose subsequent to the time that the
relation was created, if other elements of the doctrine are
present." 9 It was established at an early date, and has since
not been doubted, that there is no presumption that a servant
accepts, as an implied term of his contract, the hazards arising
from the negligence of a stranger,"' and for the most part it has
been similarly held in automobile cases involving the right of
the guest to recover against a third party. 12' Certainly the application of the doctrine in both situations is analogous in that each
arises from the connection between the parties. In the master and
1 5 See Prosser, Torts, (1941) 389, and cases cited; 3 Labatt, Master
and Servant, (1913) 3242, and cases cited. This doctrine involves one of
the earliest limitations on the theory of assumption of risk, being enunciated
in Clarke v. Holmes, (1862) 7 H. & N. 937, 21 L. J. Ex. 356, 9 L. T. 178,
8 Jur. N. S. 992. But see the criticism of the holding in this case by
Bohlen,6 Voluntary Assumption of Risk, (1906) 20 Harv. L. Rev. 91, 92, 93.
"1 The effect of the protest by a guest will be considered in the second
section of this article, at notes 269 to 287, and text.
"'7Shearman and Redfield, Law of Negligence (1913) 293, 294, and
cases cited.
11sCausation and assumption of risk in the automobile cases is discussed9 in the second section of this article, at notes 322 to 328, and text.
1 As to the enunciation of this principle in cases involving master and
servant, see 3 Labatt, Master and Servant, (1913) 3656-3659; as to the
operation of the doctrine in cases involving the automobile guest, see the
discussion in the second section of this article at notes 274 to 281, and
text.
1-OThrussel v. Handyside, (1888) 20 Q. B. D. 359, 57 L. J. Q. B. 347, 58
L. T. 344, 52 J. P. 279, Brewer v. New York L. E. & W. R. Co., (1891)
124 N. Y. 59, 26 N. E. 324.
121There is some division of authority on this question in the automobile
cases, and some confusion in the decisions The rule, however, appears to
be generally accepted. See notes 320, 321 infra, and text, in the second
section of this article.
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servant cases, the rule must, of course, be based upon contract, or
consent arising from the relation of the parties; in the automobile
cases also the rule is founded on the concept of a "relational"
interest between host and guest."2
Yet decisions relating to the automobile guest and treating the
concept as referable to the doctrine in the master-servant field
have been relatively few. Some have noticed the claimed analogy
but have refused to apply the doctrine to the automobile guest ;123
others have treated the doctrine in vehicular cases (in some
respects) as similar to but not arising from a transfer of the
theory from the relationship of employer and employee ;124 others
have noted that the doctrine as applied to motor vehicle guest cases
arose both from the master-servant and the licensor-licensee limitations on legal fault."
The Wisconsin court1 has alternately suggested that the doctrine arose from the licengor-licensee cases and
those involving master and servant.26 In rio jurisdiction has it
1. See notes 44 to 49 supra, and text.
"2-Reed v. Zellers, (1933) 273 Ill. App. 18; Kambour v. Boston & M.
R. R., (1913) 77 N. H. 33, 86 Ati. 624: "Although the cases in which
assumption of risk has been elaborated are well calculated to introduce
confusion into the law, they have no great tendency to sustain the
defendant', contention that passengers assume the risk of all injuries that
are caused by known dangers; and in so far as their contention depends for
its validity on the proposition that passengers assume the risk of such
injuries because servants assume the risk of all injuries caused by the
known dangers of the service, it is fallacious .

..

"; Buick Automobile Co.

v. Weaver, (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) 163 S. W. 594: "The relation of master
and servant not existing between appellee and appellant, neither any contractual relations, and appellee further being inexperienced and without
knowledge in the operation of automobiles, a request that appellant's driver
test the speed of the car, if held to be assumed risk, would be to say that
appellee assumed the risk of the driver's negligence ..
"
-'"McGeever v. O'Byrne, (1919) 203 Ala. 266, 82 So. 508: "Technically
speaking, the doctrine of 'assumption of risk' is founded upon contractual
undertakings, and is applicable only to servants in relation to the dangers of
their employment .

. . ."

The court then goes on to make application of

the principle to the facts presented, deciding that the facts did not justify
the application of the rule. See also Hall v. Hall, (1935) 63 S. D. 343, 258
N. W. 491: "Strictly speaking, perhaps, this doctrine of assumption of risk
as applied to nonpaying passenger cases is comparable to the original
doctrine of 'assumption of risk' referred to in the case of Maher v. Wagner,
(1934) 62 S. D. 227, 242 N. W. 647....." The last cited case relates to an

action by a servant against his master.
12-'Freedman v. Hurwitz, (1933) 116 Conn. 283, 164 Att. 647, and
White v. 'McVicker, (1933) 216 Iowa 90, 246 N. W. 385. It is possible
that the latter case was intended to be based on the master-servant
relationship, for the cases cited by the court relate to problems arising
from such connection, though reference is also made to materials dealing
with the application of the volenti non fit injuria maxim generally.
'2"Compare the concept of the doctrine as related to master and servant
cases in Judge Rosenberry's opinion in Biersach v. Wechselberg, (1931)
206 Wis. 113, 238 N. W. 905, and Judge Fowler's dissent in Scory v.
LaFave, (1934) 215 Wis. 21, 254 N. W. 643, with the suggestion of the
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been specifically suggested that the doctrine as used in automobile
cases arose solely and directly from the use of the concept in
cases involving employer and employee.
B.

POSSESSOR OF REAL PROPERTY AND THOSE COMING
ON THE PREMISES
1.

GENERALLY

In connection with the responsibility of a landowner to one
coming on his premises the term "assumption of risk" or its
equivalent has often been used to denote a limitation of the legal
liability of the host. Sometimes the term is casually and inaccurately used to limit the responsibility of a host to persons coming
on his property, in the absence of any conduct on the part of the
guest evincing a knowledge and appreciation- of a specific danger
and a voluntary assumption of risks incident to such danger.
Some cases spring from the theory that a trespasser takes the
premises as he finds them, and it may thus be said, in the popular
use of the term, that the trespasser "assumes the risk." However,
where the term is used in fixing the scope of a duty of the occupier
to the trespasser, it has rested rather on equitable, social and
ethical considerations arising from the host-guest relationship
than a strict reliance on actual or implied consent. As Professor
Prosser says: "in a civilization based on private ownership, it
is considered a socially desirable policy to let a man use his own
land in his own way, without the burden of watching for and
protecting those who come there without permission or right."1' ' 7
Although the relative rights and duties of the parties arising as
one individual comes onto the land of another (without reference
to actual knowledge or appreciation of a dangerous condition)
can hardly be said to be outlined in the old common law on the
basis of the volenti concept, the courts frequently have discussed
court in O'Shea v. Lavoy (1921) 175 Wis. 456, 185 N. W. 525, and reaffirmed thereafter in Cleary v. Eckart, (1926) 191 Wis. 114, 210 N. W.
267, and Eisenhut v. Eisenhut, (1933) 212 Wis. 467, 248 N. W. 440. It
seems probable, under all the decisions, that the cases last cited, suggesting
that the source of the doctrine relating to the automobile guest was to be
found in the host-guest cases relating to real property, is the view intended
to be adopted. See also, Campbell, Work of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
for the August 1933 and January 1934 Terms, ch. VIII, Negligence, (1934)
10 Wis. L. Rev. 67, 69, 70 in which analogy to the master-servant cases is
drawn to justify the limitation of the duty of the automobile host.
127Prosser, Torts, (1941) 611.
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the problem in terms of "assumption of risk."'' 2 Taken in its
context in the trespasser cases the phrase appears to have no
special significance, and to mean simply that where by established
precedents the host owes only a restricted duty to the guest to
preserve his premises according to a limited standard of care, the
risk of such dangers as may arise from conditions outside of that
scope of duty are "assumed" by the guest. It would be equally
definitive, and less confusing, simply to state that the plaintiff was
precluded from recovery because the defendant owed him no duty
as to the conditions which caused his damage.
With respect to the relationship between the host and a guest
who comes upon the premises by consent, the doctrine is subject
to the same criticism. So far as the "duty" of the owner or
occupier is concerned, it is generally said that he has a responsibility to a business guest to take reasonable care to discover
the actual condition of the premises and either make them safe
or warn him of existing dangers, while as to a "mere," "bare," or
"naked" licensee he has only the duty to warn of defects which
are actually known. 125 .Regarding this fundamental duty owed
by the owner or occupier, it may well be said that concerning
risks other than those as to which the courts have imposed a duty
upon him, the licensee and business guest each "assume the risk."
As in the trespasser cases, this is only another way of denominating the existence or non-existence of defendant's duty. When
both licensee and business guest know of the existence of potential
or actual dangers, it has been suggested that "Since the defendant
is under no duty to warn the plaintiff of dangers which are known
or obvious to him, the plaintiff must choose at his own risk
whether or not he shall avail himself of the defendant's consent
and has no legal ground of complaint against the defendant if his
choice proves unfortunate. Thus, by deciding to act upon the defendant's consent with knowledge of the dangers involved therein,
the plaintiff may not improperly be said to have assumed the
1211 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (1906) 155; Prosser, Torts,
(1941) 610, 611; Harper, The Law of Torts (1933) 214, 215; 3 Restatement of Torts (1934) sec. 333, limiting the duty of the landowner, excepting in cases where the owner or occupier knew or should have known of
the presence of the trespasser, and other qualifications not here important;
and Foley v. Farnham Co., (1936) 135 Me. 29, 188 Atl. 708: "He who
suffers himself to trespass assumes all risks incident to it."
12-93 Restatement of Torts sec. 342, 343; Prosser, Torts, (1941) 625,
635; Harper, The Law of Torts (1933) 221, 222, 225, and 229; Bohlen,
Duties of a Landowner (1921) 29 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 142.
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risk." 3 " The suggestion has been made both as to dangerous
conditions known to the licensee and negligent conduct of the
possessor of the premises, known to the licensee at the time he
comes on the premises. 131 Here the doctrine of a "voluntary" acceptance of a "known" and "appreciated" danger, as relating to
the conduct of the guest, becomes of substantial importance, for
under such doctrine (subject to the distinctions hereinbefore made)
it is often suggested that the possessor has no "duty" to the guest,
although it is clear that the responsibilities of the parties are
measured rather by the "conduct" of the plaintiff than a limitation
of the "duty" of the host.
Some of the early English cases relating to the duties of the
possessor of the premises to those coming on them illustrate that
the doctrine was first used with reference to the conduct of the
plaintiff toward a known and appreciated peril. As heretofore
suggested, the doctrine was applied to a trespasser having reason
to foresee the existence of spring guns on the premises and it
was held that, as to the possessor, the conduct of the trespasser
came within the maxim "volenti non fit injuria.""'I No definitive
standard of care required of a possessor of property to one coming
on the property had then been set out, and the case involved both
the "c6nduct" of the plaintiff in encountering a known peril, and
the "duty" of the defendant toward a trespasser. Thirty-five years
later, the English courts decided the first of three cases relating
to the duty of a possessor of property to one coming on the
premises, 133 in which Pollock, C. B., and Alderson, B., said that
since under the doctrine of Priestly v. Fowler14 a master had no
more duty to take care of a servant than he might be expected
to exercise to take care of himself, no duty was owed a visitorlicensee in an inn. Thereafter, in Indernzaur v. Damnes,"' it was
suggested that the rule applied to the visitor-licensee was to be
distinguished from that applicable to a business guest who was an
1303 Restatement of Torts sec. 466; Harper, The Law of Torts (1933)
229; Prosser, Torts (1941) 631, 642; 1 Street, Foundations of Legal
Liability (1906) 157.
i'133 Restatement of Torts sec. 340, 341.
S"'Ilott v. Wilkes, (1820) 3 B. & Ald. 304.
133Southcote v. Stanley, (1865) 1 H. & N. 247, 25 L. J. Ex. 339, 27
L. T. 0. S. 173.
134(1837) 3 M. & W. 1, Murp. & H. 305, 7 L. J. Ex. 42. Bramwell,
B., concurred on the ground that only acts of omission rather than those
of commission were shown, suggesting the distinction between "active" and
"passive" negligence later considered by the courts.
135(1866) 1 C. P. 281, Har. & Ruth. 243, 35 L. J. C. P. 134, 14 L. T.
484.
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employee of a contractor doing work for the possessor of the
premises, and in 1883, in the widely cited case of Heaven v.
Pendcr,13 0 the earlier cases were exhaustively discussed and the
rule definitely adopted that a landowner was under a duty to use
reasonable care to provide safe and adequate premises and appliances for the benefit of a business guest.
It will be noted that none of the three latter cases, usually
cited in discussions of the liability of the owner or occupier of
land to those coming on the property, relate to the conduct of the
guest toward dangers which he knew or had reason to know
existed on the premises. 11 7 In no one of these cases was the concept of "volenti non fit injuria'"or that of assumption of risk
suggested. In this type of case, the court quite properly adopted
the theory that the maxim had nothing to do with establishing the
original "duty" of the possessor toward those coming on the
premises.
But where the guest was shown to have actual knowledge of
peril whatever his classification as trespasser, licensee, or business guest, his conduct in encountering the danger was not infrequently said to show that he had voluntarily encountered the
risk and hence came within the maxim. 131 This concept of the
1,34(1883) 11 Q. B. D. 503, 52 L. J.Q. B. 702, 49 L. T. 357, 47 J.P. 709.
7
1, It was, however mentioned in Indermaur v. Dames, (1866) 1 C. P.
281, Har. & Ruth. 243, 35 L. 3. C. P. 134, 14 L. T. 484, that since the
employee of the contractor was not familiar with the sugar refining industry,
he could not be expected to anticipate that an aperture would exist on the
floor of the building, used as a chute for transporting sugar within the
pren1iies.
V- See Britton v. Great Western Cotton Co., (1872) L. R. 7 Ex. 130,
41 L. J.Ex. 99, 27 L. T. 125, 20 W. R. 525; XVoodley v. Metropolitan Dist.
R. Co., (1877) 2 Ex. Div. 384, 46 L. J.Q. B. 521, 36 L. T. 419, 42 J.P.
181; and Membery v. Great Western Ry. Co., (1889) 14 App. Cas. 179,
58 L. J.Q. B. 563. 61 L. T. 566, 54 J.P. 244, 5 T. L. R. 468. A number of
early American cases helped establish the doctrine suggested in those cases,
that an employee of a contractor or another third party, who was doing
work on the premises of defendant pursuant to his employment is barred
from recovery against the defendant because of his knowledge of the dangerous and defective condition or operation of the business conducted in the
premises: Wood v. Lock, (1888) 147 Mass. 604, 18 N. E. 578; Miner v.
Conn. River R. Co. (1891) 153 Mass. 398, 26 N. E. 994; Wagner v. Boston
Elevated R. Co., (1905) 188 Mass. 437, 74 N. E. 919; Stevens v. United
Gas & Electric Co., (1905) 73 N. H. 159, 60 Ati. 848
But cf. Thrussel v. Handyside, (188) 20 Q. B. D. 359, 57 L. J.Q. B.
347, 58 L. T. 344, holding in effect that the element of "voluntary" action
was not present because the employee was forced to face the danger in
order to continue his employment with the third person, and comments
upon the case by Professor Warren, Volenti Non Fit Injuria, (1895) 8
Harv. L. Rev. 457, 471.
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application of the doctrine in the real property cases was adopted
139
and applied in the American decisions.

2.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN "ACTIVE"

AND "PASSIVE"

NEGLIGENCE

Whether the one on the premises of the possessor is a trespasser or a licensee, it must be clear that under the real property
cases the host, knowing of the presence of the guest, has a
duty not negligently to injure him or, as has sometimes been
said, the injured party does not assume the risk of the "active"
negligence of the defendant 140 and on this basis some commentators have suggested generally that the plaintiff can not assume the
risk of any negligence of the defendant.141
The distinction in the real property cases seems to have
been suggested first by Lord Bramwell in Southcote v. Stanley 142 and has been considered in many of the discussions of
the duty of the possessor of property to those whom he knows
may be on the premises. Whatever may have been the motivation
for such a distinction in the early cases, the distinction between
139E. g. Wood v. Lock, Miner v. Conn. River R. Co., Wagner v. Boston Elevated R. Co., and Stevens v. United Gas & Electric Co., cited supra
note 138; Harobine v. Abbott, (1900) 177 Mass. 59, 58 N. E. 284; Clark
v. Mich. Cent. R. Co., (1897) 113 Mich. 24, 71 N. W. 327; Massey v.
Seller, (1904) 45 Ore. 267, 77 Pac. 397; McGinn v. French, (1900) 107
Wis. 54, 82 N. W. 724. Later decisions include Batson v. W. U. Tel. Co.,
(C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1935) 75 F. (2d) 154; Paubel v. Hitz, (1936) 339 Mo.
App. 274, 96 S. W. (2d) 369; Hunn v. Windsor Hotel Co., (1937) 119
W. Va. 215, 193 S. E. 57; and see Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Monroe, (1931) 237 Ky. 60, 34 S. W. (2d) 929, treating contributory negligence
as coexistent with assumption of risk by conduct.
140As to the existence of such a duty to trespassers, see Harper. The
Law of Torts (1933) 229; 3 Restatement of Torts sec. 337; Prosser, Torts
(1941) 613, 614. As to licensees, see Harper, ibid.: "Whether the persons
are trespassers, persons on the land by mere toleration, by permission
gratuitously given, or by invitation for the mutual advantage of the parties,
the possessor must save them harmless from wilful or intentional harm and
from active negligence (misfeasance) after their presence is known, or
should be known"; Restatement, Torts, sec. 341: "A possessor of land is
subject to liability to licensees, whether business visitors or gratuitous
licensees, for bodily harm caused to them by his failure to carry on his
activities with reasonable care for their safety, unless the licensees know
or from facts known to them, should know of the possessor's activities and
of the risk involved therein"; and Prosser, Torts, (1941) 630: "It is now
generally held that as to any active operations which the occupier carries
on, there is an obligation to exercise reasonable care for the protection of
a licensee. He must run his train, operate his machinery, or back his truck
with due regard for the possibility that the permission given may have been
accepted
and the guest must be present."
141 See Bevan, Negligence (1928) 796: "...
the maxim . . . clearly
does not apply where there is negligence." (Citing earlier commentators).
and Pollock, The Law of Torts (1923) 169.
142(1856) 1 H. & N. 247, 25 L. J. Ex. 339, 27 L. T. 0. S. 173.

THE RATIONALE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK

an act of commission and an act of omission seems not to be
significant under present economic and social conditions, and it
was ignored by the editors of the Restatement. 143 Moreover, the
general tenor of the cases which have discussed the distinction
in recent years denominates the conduct of the host in actively
changing the original conditions encountered by the guest as the
essence of the active negligence concept."' In so far as the real
property cases furnish an analogy for the application of the rule
in the automobile cases, it would seem that the doctrine would
have no place where (a) the presence of the licensee was known,
(b) the host actively changed the situation to increase the risk
to the licensee, and (c) the increased risk was not known, appreciated, and voluntarily incurred by the guest. In short, as Bevan
and Pollock have suggested, the guest in the real property cases
does not "assume the risk" of the negligence of the host unless he
voluntarily encounters the specific risk which causes the damage,
and his mere position as a guest is insufficient in itself to establish that he did so encounter the risk. Or, to expand the concept
still further, the doctrine is not broad enough to prevent recovery
by a guest for damages caused by the negligence of the possessor
unless the guest knew of specific risks in addition to the general
area of danger involved in going on the premises or in the automobile of another. After the presence of the guest is known to
the host, the guest need not anticipate that, as to dangers not
known to him, the host will act other than as a reasonably prudent
person would have acted.
Akin to the liability of the host for active negligence after the
presence of the guest on the premises is or ought to be known to
him, is the doctrine that he is responsible for damages suffered
even by a mere licensee when the damages arise out of hidden
perils which may be in the nature of a trap, and of which the
143lRestatement of Torts (1934) sec. 337, 341.
'14 The rule has been succinctly stated by Bohlen, Studies in the Law of
Torts, (1926) 171, as follows: ". . . while a licensee takes the risk of the
physical condition of the premises he does not take the risk of dangers
super-added by the active misconduct of his host." A comprehensive collection of the early English cases on the subject is made in an annotation,
Liability to Trespasser or Bare Licensee as Affected by Distinction between
Active and Passive Negligence, 49 A. L. R. 778; and a group of the more
important modern cases has been collected also in Green, The Judicial
Process in Tort Cases, (1939) 561. The subject has never been exhaustively
and critically treated by commentators, but even a casual survey of the
cases collected reveals the validity of Professor Prosser's suggestion that
more recent decisions support the view that "as to any active operations
which the occupier carries on, there is an obligation to exercise reasonable
care for the protection of a licensee." Prosser, Torts, (1941) 630.
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host is aware. The term "trap," used in a vague and indeterminate sense to include almost all hidden perils unknown to the
guest, was utilized in extending the .responsibilities of a host in
the early English cases, and this concept of liability for defective
premises (as distinguished from negligent operations on the
premises) is now well established.141
The classification, in the real property cases, of a social guest
as a mere licensee, was also first recognized in 1856 in the case
of Southcote v. Stanley,'146 and has a direct bearing on the status
of the automobile guest. The parallel is particularly pointed in
automobile cases where the duty of the host to prepare the
17
vehicular "premises" for safe conduct of the guest is at issue.
The conclusions of the principal case have been, in this respect,
widely adopted by the courts, and commentators on the subject
have agreed not only that a social guest has the status of a
s
also that such status prevails whether the guest
licensee 14-but
was an invitee or was self invited."'
The above general principles relating to the application of the
doctrine in the real property cases are, of course, those most pertinent in application to the automobile cases. The social background
of the doctrine in each case is somewhat similar, and the analogy
between the two factual situations has in fact been utilized by the
courts in delineating respective duties in the relationship of automobile guest and host in this country. In many cases where the
doctrine of assumption of risk is not specifically mentioned, the
general rule of determining the liability of the operator of an auto4 C. B.
145As to the early English cases, see Corby v. Hill, (1858)
N. S. 556, 27 L. 3. C. P. 318, 31 L. T. 0. S. 181, 22 J. P. 386; Southcote v.
Stanley, (1856) 1 H. & N. 247, 25 L. J. Ex. 339, 27 L. T. 0. S. 173;
Indermaur v. Dames, (1866) L. R. 1 C. P. 274, Har. & Ruth. 243, 35 L. J.
C. P. 184, 14 L. T. 484. And see discussion of this subject of defective
premises with reference to Priestly v. Fowler, in note 10 supra.
As to more recent enunciations of the rule, see 1 Street, Foundations
of Legal Liability, (1906) 157: "But they [licensees] do not assume extraordinary risk such as is incident to a defect in the nature of a concealed trap":
Harper, The Law of Torts, (1933) 222; ". . . anything in the nature of
a trap or hidden peril, highly dangerous to life or limb, is a risk that comes
within the 'duty of care imposed upon the possessor"; 3 Restatement of
Torts, (1934) sec. 342, 345.
146(1866) L. R. 1 C. P. 274, Har. & Ruth. 243, 35 L. J. C. P. 184,
14 L. T. 484.
147The rule will be discussed more fully in the second section of this
article. See notes 264 to 273 and text, discussing the status of the automobile guest as a licensee, and the duty of the host as to defects in the
mechanical condition of the vehicle.
sec. 331; Prosser, Torts, (1941)
14*3 Restatement of Torts, (1934)
627; 49
Harper, The Law of Torts, (1933) 224.
1 Harper, ibid.; Prosser, ibid.

THE RATIONALE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK

mobile toward his guest is established through reference to the principles of licensor and licensee in the real property cases. Indeed, the
standard rule adopted in almost all states is based upon cases
specifically referring to the duty of a host to take reasonable care
for the presence of one properly on the premises, even though he
be a mere licensee,' " notwithstanding that in some states it was
'--Cf. McGeever v. O'Byrne, (1919) 203 Ala. 266, 82 So. 508, suggesting that the doctrine had been used in cases other than master and servant
and conceding that the requirement of reasonable care existed to the guest,
with the earlier case of Perkins v. Galloway, (1915) 194 Ala. 265, 69 So.
875, relying on Lygo v. Newbold, (1854) 9 Ex. 302, 2 C. L. R. 449, 23 L. J.
Ex. 108, 22 L. T. 0. S. 226, which set up the requirement that the host
exercise reasonable care, and Crider v. Yolande Coal & Coke Co., (1921)
206 Ala. 71, 89 So. 285, which suggested that a gratuitous guest was a
.,mere licensee" and that no duty was owed to him except to refrain from
wanton and intentional wrong. The latter case was overruled in the case
of Wurtzburger v. Oglesby, (1930) 222 Ala. 151, 130 So. 9, setting up
the distinction between the real property and automobile cases on social
grounds: "If the plaintiff is only entitled to protection against wanton
injury, then it may happen that if a person requests gratuitous transportation for himself and also for a basket of apples, the gratuitous private carrier may be liable for injury to the property, but not for injury to him,
although he committed his person to the keeping of the carrier as fully as
he did the property"; Dickerson v. Connecticut Co., (1922) 98 Conn. 87,
118 Atl. 518; Munson v. Rupker, (1923) 96 Ind. App. 15, 148 N. E. 169,
aff'd 151 N. E. 101, in which the theory that under the real property cases
the host was liable only for wanton misconduct to the guest was renounced:
"The rule as to trespassers and licensees upon real estate with all its niceties
and distinctions, is not to be applied to one riding in an automobile at the
invitation of, or with the knowledge and tacit consent of the owner and
operator of the automobile"; Beard v. Klusmeier, (1914) 158 Ky. 153, 164
S. W. 319, declaring that a duty to exercise reasonable care existed in
automobile cases to an invited guest because that duty also existed in the
real property cases; Jacobs v. Jacobs, (1917) 141 La. 272, 74 So. 992,
relying on Beard v. Klusmeier, supra, and Fitzjarrel v. Boyd, infra;
Avery v. Thompson, (1918) 117 Me. 120, 103 Atl. 4, which collects many
of the cases and relies on this theory among others; Fitzjarrel v. Boyd,
(1914) 123 Md. 497, 91 Atl. 547, citing cases adopting the licensor-licensee
concept of the duty; Roy v. Kirn, (1919) 208 Mich. 571, 175 N. W. 475,
citing Jacobs v. Jacobs, supra, and Avery v. Thompson, supra; Monsour
v. Farris, (1938) 181 Miss. 803, 181 So. 326: ". . . the relation between
the parties is that of licensor and licensee . . . "; Liston v. Reynolds, (1924)

69 Mont. 480, 223 Pac. 507, holding that the duty of reasonable care was
owed to an invitee; Bauer v. Griess, (1920) 105 Neb. 381, 181 N. W. 156,
relying on Beard v. Klusmeier, supra; Lutvin v. Dopkus, (1920) 94 N. J. L.
64. 108 AtI. 862, acknowledging the correlation between the doctrines but
refusing to require the standard of reasonable care toward a self-invited
guest; MacKenzie v. Oakley, (1920) 94 N. J. L. 66, 108 Atl. 771, applying
the requirement of reasonable care on the basis of the real property case
of Phillips v. Library Co., (1893) 55 N. J. L. 307, 27 At. 478; Patnode
v. Foote, (1912) 153 App. Div. 494, 138 N. Y. S. 221, citing the earlier real
property case of Birch v. City of New York, (1907) 190 N. Y. 397, 83
N. E. 51; Carroll v. Yonkers, (1920) 193 App. Div. 655, 184 N. Y. S. 847;
Amann v. Thurston, (1928) 133 Misc. Rep. 293, 231 N. Y. S. 657; Grabeau
v. Pudwill, (1920) 45 N. D. 423, 178 N. W. 124; Stewart v. Houk, (1928)
127 Ore. 589, 271 Pac. 998; Pettys v. Leith, (1933) 62 S. D. 149, 252 N. W.
18; Tennessee C. R. Co. v. Vanhoy, (1920) 143 Tenn. 312, 226 S. W. 225;
.Marple v. Haddad, (1927) 102 W. Va. 508, 138 S. E. 113; O'Shea v. Lavoy,
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thought that the only duty owed by the host in real property
cases was to abstain from wilfully injuring such a guest. 15 1 Closely
akin to this type of case are those automobile cases which suggest
that the host is under a duty not to lay a "trap" for a guest,
following this rationale in the real property cases. 152- In many

states, the common law rule that the host is under a duty to
exercise reasonable care for the protection" of his guest has been
limited by the so-called guest statutes, which will receive more
specific attention hereafter.
It has often been said that the duty of the host is to refrain
from increasing the danger to the guest."^ If, thus, the analogy to
the real property cases is to be adopted in the automobile cases,
it must be said that here also the guest accepts the risk of known
dangers in the premises, but not the risk of the "active" negligence of the host. Again the question arises as to the distinction
between "active" and "passive" negligence. Is it a wrong of
commission when a host drives too fast, or a wrong of omission
because he fails to drive properly? His duty is to drive properly;
failure to do so might appear to be an omission; but certainly
driving an automobile is "action" as compared to the individual
who simply allows a defective condition of his premises to continue. Some cases are directly in point in holding that the improper operation of an automobile is "active" negligence toward
a licensee guest in an automobile. 5 The course of the English
(1921) 175 Wis. 456, 185 N. W. 525: "Whether or not the established rules
of liability existing between licensor and licensee are applicable in the matter of the 'management' of the automobile, they plainly are applicable so
far as the 'condition' of the automobile is concerned"; the acceptance by the
guest of the condition of the driver or the "management" of the automobile, being made a part of the limitation of the duty of the host in
Cleary v. Eckart, (1926) 191 Wis. 114, 210 N. W. 267, on the basis of
the O'Shea Case; Ingerick v. Mess, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1933) 63 F. (2d)
233.
'1'Crider v. Yolande Coal & Coke Co., ibid; Munson v. Rupker, ibid;
Grabeau v. Pudwill, ibid; cf. Stewart v. Houk, ibid, with Peters v. Johnson,
(1928) 124 Ore. 237, 264 Pac. 459. This concept of the host-guest relation
obtained at an early date in Massachusetts, West v. Poor, (1907) 196 Mass.
183, 81 N. E. 960, but has since been abandoned. See Massaletti v. Fitzroy,
(1917) 228 Mass. 487, 118 N. E. 168.
152As to use of this technique in extending the liability of the automobile host, see Albers v. Shell Co. of California, (1930) 104 Cal. App. 733,
286 Pac. 752; Higgins v. Mason, (1930) 255 N. Y. 104, 174 N. E. 77;
Marple v. Haddad, (1927) 102 W. Va. 508, 138 S. E. 113; O'Shea v. Lavoy,
(1921) 175 Wis. 456, 185 N. W. 525; Harris v. Perry & Co. [1903] 2 K. B.
219, 72 L. J. K. B. 725, 89 L. T. 174.
153The subject is considered in detail in the second section of this
article at notes 242 to 263 and text.
154The principle is most exhaustively discussed in the case of Pigeon
v. Lane, (1907) 80 Conn. 237, 67 AUt. 886, which established that in such

THE RATIONALE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK

courts in dealing -with the 'passenger cases has been most confusing. After first holding that a guest could recover for ordinary
negligence of the host even though he were a gratuitous bailee, 155
then holding that a gratuitous bailee must show gross negligence
to justify recovery against the bailor-host,"" and then reaffirming
that a mere licensee could recover upon a showing of lack of
ordinary care, 5 7 it was finally held that the doctrine of assumption
of risk had no application to cases involving an automobile guest,
since the guest never assumed the risk of the negligence of his
host.Y"
3.

DEFECTIVE CONDITIONS IN PREMISES OR EQUIPMENT

Particularly analogous to the real property principles referring
to the doctrine are those automobile cases involving defective
mechanical equipment. In cases involving the automobile guest, as
well as in those involving real property, no distinction is made
between a social invitee and a permissive licensee or self-invited
guest. "
cases "active" negligence would be required to impose liability. The term
was later considered by the same court in Dickerson v. Connecticut Co.
(1922) 98 Conn. 87, 118 Atl. 518. See also Gay v. Cadwallader-Gibson
Co., (1931) 34 Cal. App. (2d) 566, 93 P. (2d) 1051; Babcock &-Wilcox
Co. v. Nolton, (1937) 58 Nev. 133, 71 P. (2d) 1051; Grabeau v. Pudwill,
(1920) 45 N. D. 423, 178 N. W. 124; and Brigman v. Fiske-Carter Const.
Co., (1926) 192 N. C. 791, 136 S. E. 125.
1'V'Lygo v. Newbold, (1854) 9 Ex. 300, 23 L. J.Ex. 108, 22 L. T. 0. S.
226, per Parke, B.
I'5Moffatt v. Bateman, (1869) 3 P. C. 115, 22 L. T. 140, per Lord
Chelmsford: ". . . a person offering another a seat in a carriage which he
is driving . . . if liable at all for an accident afterwards occurring, could
only be so for negligence of a gross description." The case was quoted with
approval in Coughlin v. Gillison, [1899] 1 Q. B. 145, 68 L. J. Q. B. 147,
79 L. T. 627.
157Harris v. Perry & Co., [1903] 2 K. B. 219; 72 L. J. K. B. 725, 89
L. T. 174; Karavias v. Callinicos, [1917] 143 L. T. J. 237. The case of
Harris v. Perry & Co., however, was apparently decided on the theory that

Southcote's Case, (1601) 4 Co. Rep. 83, related to a gratuitous undertaking; the case in fact referred to carriage for hire.
" *Dann v. Hamilton, [1939] 1 K. B. 509, 108 L. J. K. B. 255, 55
T. L. R. 297, 160 L. T. 433.

1OBlack v. Goldweber, (1927) 172 Ark. 862, 291 S. W. 760; Roberson

v. Roberson, (1938) 193 Ark. 669, 101 S. W. (2d) 961; Grassie v. American La France Engine Co., (1928) 95 Cal. App. 384, 272 Pac. 1073; Greene
v. Miller, (1931) 102 Fla. 767, 136 So. 532; Lasley v. Crawford, (1923)
228 Ill. App. 590; Munson v. Rupker, (1925) 96 Ind. App. 15, 148 N. E.
169; Chanson v. Morgan's La. & T. R. & S. S. Co., (1932) 18 La. App.
602, 136 So. 647; Roy v. Kirn, (1919) 208 Mich. 571, 175 N. W. 475;
Green v. Maddox, (1935) 168 Miss. 171, 151 So. 160; Amann v. Thurston,
(1928) 133 Misc. Rep. 293, 231 N. Y. S.657; Grabeau v. Pudwill, (1920)
45 N. D. 423, 178 N. W. 424; Conroy v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co.,
(1928) 292 Pa. St. 219, 140 At. 905, and Ferrell v. Solski, (1924) 278
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It has been noted that a separate division of the factual situations to which the doctrine was applied in real property cases
related to the "conduct" of the guest, as distinguished from the
"duty" of the host. The same division may appropriately be made
in cases involving the automobile guest. Principles discussed above
relate to limitations on the duty of the host in such cases; the
principles following relate to the conduct of the guest in encountering known and appreciated dangers voluntarily. The cases decided upon this concept can in turn be sub-divided into two groups:
first, where risk is assumed by engaging in the journey where the
risk is apparent, and second, where risk is assumed in continuing
in a journey where risk becomes apparent after the journey is
begun. Since the conduct of the guest in such cases is the essence
of the 'non-liability of the defendant, and since in most cases the
factual situations are such that it might equally well be said
that the guest was guilty of contributory negligence, confusion
between the two concepts is here inevitable. But whether both
defenses are applicable to one state of facts, the use of the assumption of risk analogy to the doctrine in the real property cases is
clear. It has been said quite often that one who accepts a ride
in a motor vehicle when he knows that the mechanism is defective
assumes the risk of injury thereby, 60 and the affinity to the theory
that recovery is barred to one who voluntarily encounters apparent
perils in defective premises is manifest. And if the doctrine is
to be extended to defects in the automobile, there is nothing
illogical, as the Wisconsin and South Dakota courts have suggested, 16' in extending the doctrine to include defects in the driver
-that is to say, his known propensity to act other than a reasonably prudent man would have acted, or his known lack of skill
or experience. Whatever may be said concerning the social
Pa. St. 565, 123 Atl. 493, which apparently establish the rule, once rendered
doubtful by the case of Cody v. Venzie, (1919) 263 Pa. St. 541, 107 Atl.
383; Holdhusen v. Schaibel, (1932) 60 S. D. 275, 244 N. W. 392; Robinson
v. Leonard, (1926) 100 Vt. 1, 134 Atl. 706; Mitchell v. Raymond, (1923)
181 Wis. 591, 195 N. W. 855; Sommerfield v. Flury, (1929) 198 Wis. 163,
223 N. W. 409; Harris v. Perry & Co., [1903] 2 K. B. 219, 72 L. J. K. B.
725, 89 L. T. 174.
The New Jersey court has consistently held against the weight of
authority since its decision in Lutvin v. Dopkus, (1920) 94 N. J. L. 64, 108
Atl. 862, through a series of cases up to and including Myers v. Sauer.
(1937) 117 N. J. L. 254, 182 Atl. 634.
'6OThe rule is discussed in the second section of this article in notes
269-271, and text.
16'Hall v. Hall, (1935) 63 S. D. 343, 258 N. W. 491; Cleary v. Eckart,
(1926) 191 Wis. 114, 210 N. W. 267.
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desirability of imposing two different measures of the conduct of
the guest through application of the doctrine of assumption of risk
and contributory negligence (with attendant variations in the
effect of the two doctrines on the right of the guest to recover
damages), it must be conceded that the doctrine of assumption of
risk in the automobile cases springs logically enough from the real
property field. Courts have consistently applied the doctrine to
situations involving known incompetence and lack of skill of the
driver." -' Whether these cases conflict with the conclusions of
the courts in real property cases that the guest never assumes
the risk of the negligence of the host will be discussed hereafter.
C.

"NON-RELATIONAL"

CASES CONCERNING TRAVEL

The early cases dealing with accidents on the highways,
whether damage was due to the conduct of other users of the
highway or the defective condition of the way, are not enlightening in ascertaining the source of the doctrine. As has been suggested, commentators have agreed that the doctrine is based on
"relational" interests between the parties and is not properly applicable in the absence of such connection. Obviously, no "relation" exists (in the sense in which the word has heretofore been
used by the courts) between two motorists on the highway, and
the existence of a "relational" interest between the user of a highway and the individual or governmental subdivision charged with
maintenance of the highway never has been judicially suggested
or approved. The doctrine is sometimes loosely suggested in the
opinions relating to the liability of a governmental subdivision
that one who comes to a defective condition in a highway and
realizes the danger "assumes the risk" of injury therefrom, but
the cases with two exceptions' 0 are in fact founded upon the
defense of contributory negligence.1

4

The same situation prevails

in the older cases which referred to "assumption of risk" in cases
1',-'VXarious illustrations of this application of the doctrine are indicated
in the second section of this article in notes 290, 291, 294, 296-315, and text.
The theory that a guest may "assume the risk" of known dangers on the
premises of the possessor is discussed in notes 138, 139, supra, and text.
'1"Pomeroy v. Westfield, (1891) 154 Miass. 462, 28 N. E. 899, per
Holmes, J.; and Williams v. Main Island Creek Coal Co., (1919) 83
W. Va. 464, 98 S. E. 511.
'*"See, e. g., Holliday v. Athens, (1912) 10 Ga. Ap. 709, 74 S. E. 67;
McHugh v. City of St. Paul, (1897) 67 M[inn. 441, 70 N. W. 5; and City
of Dayton v. Taylor's Adm'r, (1900) 62 Ohio St. 11, 56 N. E. 480.
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concerning the respective rights of operators of vehicles. 1 5 None
of the automobile guest decisions rests on an analogy to these cases.
D.

LIABILITY OF CARRIERS FOR DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY
PASSENGERS

The decisions relating to passengers on railroads and steamships afford little more enlightenment as to the basis of the concept
in the automobile cases. In so far as the obligation of the carrier
company to its passengers is concerned, it is clear that a "relational" interest is present. The term was occasionally used in the
earlier cases to designate a limitation of the "duty" of the carrier,
pointing out that it was not an insurer of the safety of the passenger, but was liable only for some degree of negligence, 6 " and that
165 E. g., Illedge v. Goodwin, (1831) 5 C. & P. 190; Borden's Condensed Milk Co. v. Mosby, (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1918) 250 Fed. 839: "In taking
the wrong side of the road, the driver assumed the risk of his experiment,
and it was for him to use greater care than would have been required of
him if he had kept on the right side"; Reynolds v. Mo. K. & T. Ry. Co.,
(1904) 70 Kan. 340, 78 Pac. 801, where a teamster lost his balance while
driving over a defective railroad crossing: ". . . he voluntarily incurred
danger and failed to exercise ordinary care for his safety by standing in his
wagon under such circumstances"; Collins v. Hustis, (1929) 79 N. H. 446,
111 Atl. 286, relating to a railroad crossing accident, where it was said:
"If . . . O'Brien observed the train and attempted to cross in front of it,
and the collision resulted from his miscalculation of the speed of the train
... he voluntarily put himself in a place of danger of his own motion, and
cannot recover from the results of his own act." This might be thought to
be an application of the doctrine, except that the New Hampshire court had
specifically held in the case of Kambour v. Boston & M. R. R. (1913) 77
N. H. 33, 86 Atl. 624, that the doctrine did not exist outside of contract in
that state, and the court in the Collins case cited other authorities which
held that facts stated established prima facie proof of negligence. An exhaustive discussion of the application of the doctrine to cases involving a crossing accident is had in Gover v. Central Vermont R. Co., (1922) 96 Vt. 208,
118 At. 874, in which the court found that the doctrine is applicable where
there has been a voluntary exposure to a known and comprehended danger
(no reference being made to the "relational" interests of the parties) but
refused to apply the doctrine in the absence of a showing of voluntary
action by the plaintiff; and see, to the same effect, Warren v. Boston & M.
R. R. (1895) 163 Mass. 484, 40 N. E. 895, refusing to apply the doctrine
where actual knowledge of peril did not exist, but not discussing the
absence of "relational" interests between the parties.
In Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Brown, (1918) 139 Tenn. 640, 202 S. W.
926, the term "assumes the risk" was apparently used to illustrate the
principle that the accident was unavoidable and that no duty was owed by
the driver of an automobile toward the driver of a horse which took fright
at the vehicle, unless the driver of the car was negligent in permitting the
motor to remain running while the car was parked.
"16McKinneyv. Neil, (C.C. Ohio 1840) 1 McLean 540, Fed. Cas. No.
8865: "There are certain risks which are incurred by every stage passenger,
and for which the proprietor is not responsible. These are those casualties
which human sagacity cannot foresee, and against which the utmost
prudence cannot guard. . . . And every passenger must make up his mind
to meet the risks incident to the mode of travel he adopts . . . "; see
also Galena & C. U. R. Co. v. Fay, (1855) 16 Ill. 558.
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the transportation agency did not owe the same duty of care to
one riding on a freight train as to one riding on a train for the
use of passengers. 16 7 With respect to the "conduct" of the guest,
factual situations seem to be somewhat correlative to those involved in the real property and the automobile guest cases. The
term was used where a passenger attempted to cross between
cars after alighting from a train ;'Os where he took a dangerous
way to reach a meal station, after leaving the train ;19 and where
he was injured because of the absence of proper equipment in
sleeping quarters. 170 However, none of the cases involving the
automobile guest refer to the application of the doctrine in the
carrier cases as a basis for the adoption of the rule.
Earlier cases involving the conduct of persons in boarding,
leaving and riding on street railways often referred to the conduct
of the passengers in certain circumstances as constituting an assumnption of risk of injury. Here also the "relational" interest
between the parties is present, and the factual situation seems
analogous to that of the automobile guest riding on the outside of
17
an automobile or in an overcrowded vehicleY.
However, only one
7
"' Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Hazzard, (1861) 26 Ill. 373: Assumption
of risk due to riding in a caboose, "an inferior mode of conveyance," arises
from an implied agreement to accept and be satisfied with such accommodations as that particular car afforded--"a passenger takes all the risks incident
to the mode of travel, and the character of the means of conveyance which be
selects, the party furnishing the conveyance being only required to adapt
the proper care, vigilance and skill to the particular means." See also
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Needham, (C.C.A. 4th cir. 1917) 244 Fed.
146. (passenger assumes risk of swaying of car consistent with proper
operation); Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Lippman, (1900) 110 Ga. 665,
36 S. E. 202, (risk of usual jolts and jars on freight train assumed);
Symonds v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., (1902) 87 Minn. 408, 92 N. W.
409, (casual risks and discomforts incident to movement of mixed trains
assumed) ; Steele v. Southern Ry. Co., (1899) 55 S. C. 389, 33 S. E. 509,
(additional risk of riding in caboose assumed) ; Lovett v. Gulf, C. & S. F.
R. Co., (1904) 97 Tex. 436, 79 S. W. 514, (risk of riding in gravel train
assumed as to ordinary methods of operating the conveyance) ; Millers
Creek R. Co. v. Blevins, (1918) 181 Ky. 800, 205 S. IV. 911, (casual risks
of handling of mixed trains assumed) ; Harvey v. Deep River Logging Co.,
(1907) 49 Ore. 583, 90 Pac. 501, (risks naturally incident to the character
and equipment of a logging train assumed). A shipper tending livestock on
a train assumes risks of dangers resulting from his peculiar duties, but not
the risk of the carrier's negligence. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Trovee
(1905)6 70 Neb. 293, 103 N. W. 680.
' 1Kriwinski v. Penn. R. Co., (1900) 65 N. J. L. 293, 47 Atl. 447.
°'FIDuvernet v. Morgan's La. & T. R. R. & S. S. Co., (1897) 49 La.
Ann. 484. See also Hopkins v. West Jersey & S. R. Co., (1909) 225 Pa. St.
193, 73 Atl. 1104.
17"International
M. M. Co. v. Smith, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1906) 145 F. 891.
171 As to automobile cases involving overcrowding and riding on the
outside of the vehicle, see the second section of this article at notes 316 to
319, and text.
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case appears to indicate specifically a distinction between the
doctrine of assumption of risk and that of contributory negligence
under such circumstances, 1 2 and the'distinction sought to be made
is confusing. A perusal of the cases, 173 all of which discuss the
negligence of the plaintiff guest in some degree, leads to the conclusion that the courts were using the terminology of assumption
of risk because it afforded a more simple method of saying that
the conduct of the plaintiff must have been a contributing factor
to his damage in order to bar a recovery. After discussing the
negligence of the defendant, the courts were inclined to suggest
that the plaintiff assumed the risk of some damage from riding
on the outside of the car, or trying to board a moving car, but
did not assume the risk of negligent management of the vehicle.
The same result might also have been reached by classifying the
conduct of the plaintiff as negligent, but asserting that the conduct
of the operator of the street car in suddenly accelerating speed
was the proximate cause of the accident. Here, as in many cases,
it is difficult to ascertain whether the courts in using the term
"assumption of risk" or words of like import intended in doing
so to use them as simply descriptive of a condition classified legally
as contributory negligence, or to indicate a definitive doctrine in
establishing legal fault.17 4 The technique of limiting the risks as-

173
sumed to matters other than the negligence of the defendant
seems to indicate that the courts considered the doctrine as one
separate and independent from that of contributory negligence.
The decisions relating to the automobile guest have not relied
on the use of the doctrine in the street railway cases to support
that later application of the rule.

E.

USE OF THE DOCTRINE WITH REFERENCE TO RESCUES

Another field in which the term "assumption of risk" has become widely used relates to cases in which the plaintiff seeks to
172
Kebbee v. Connecticut Co., (1912) 85 Conn. 641, 84 Atl. 329.
173Lauterer v. Manhattan R. Co., (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1904) 128 F. 540;
Graff v. United Railroads of San Francisco, (1918) 178 Cal. 171, 172 Pac.
603; Burns v. Boston El. R. Co., (1903) 183 Mass. 96, 66 N. E. 418; Gunn
v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, (1917) 270 Mo. 517, 193 S. W. 814:
Paquin v. St. L. & S. R. Co., (1901) 90 Mo. App. 118; Joyce v. Metropolitan St. R. Co., (1909) 219 Mo. 344, 118 S. W. 21 ; Murphy v. North Jersey
St. Ry. Co., (1904) 71 N. J. L. 5, 58 AtI. 1018; Nies v. Brooklyn H. R.
Co., (1902) 68 App. Div. 259, 74 N. Y. S. 41, semble; Burns v. Johnstown
Pass. Ry. Co., (1906) 213 Pa. St. 143, 62 At. 564; Verrone v. Rhode
Island S. R. Co., (1905) 27 R. I. 370, 62 Atl. 512.
174See, e. g., Graff v. United Railroads of San Francisco, ibid.; Gunn
v. United Railways Co. of St. Louis, ibid.; Paquin v. St. L. & S. R. Co.,
ibid.; anl Verrone v. Rhole Island S. R. Co., ibid.
I

Ibid.
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preserve life or property at some risk to himself, with knowledge
of the danger involved. Assuming that the doctrine of assumption
of risk need not be based on a "relational" interest between the
parties, it is clear that a rescuer dashing into a burning building
to save his child does so voluntarily and with full knowledge of
the risk he runs. It has been generally said that in such cases the
act of the defendant does not come within the doctrine because
the conduct was not "voluntary," if the risk involved in the rescue
was reasonably encountered.'- 6 In so far as the courts have attempted to apply the doctrine in these cases it is clearly inconsistent with the requirement heretofore suggested that a "relational" affinity must exist before the rule becomes properly
applicable. In any event, none of the automobile guest cases refer
to the rescue cases, and because of the dissimilar factual situations,
analogies appear inapplicable.
V.

THE REQUIREMENT THAT THERE BE A "VOLUNTARY"
ASSUMPTION OF A "KNOwN"

A.

AND "APPRECIATED"

ELEMENTS OF "VOLUNTARY"
INDISTINGUISHABLE FROMA

RISK

ASSU.%iPTION OF RISK AS

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

The prerequisite of the doctrine which seems to have caused
the most confusion in the courts is that which requires the action
of the plaintiff to be "voluntary." It has been generally conceded
by commentators that the requirement exists as to all cases in
which the doctrine is used. 7 7

Since the term essentially has

reference to a state of mind concerning which the defendant would
be unable to introduce proof, courts generally have set up specific
standards by which to measure the conduct of the plaintiff under
the doctrine as voluntary or involuntary. For instance, when a
servant faces an extraordinary risk created by the master, his conduct in continuing his employment has generally been said to show
that the danger was voluntarily encountered, or that "the consent is
'1''Sce Prosser, Torts, (1941) 390; Harper, The Law of Torts, (1933)
294, 295; and cases cited. Bohlen, however, has suggested that the rationale
for the rule arises from the fact that the rescuer has the right to find the
premises free from danger. See Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk,
(1906) 20 Harv. L. R. 20, 21, and 22. See also general discussion in Note:
(1936)7 21 Ia. L. Rev. 650, and note 30, supra.
', Bohlen, supra note 10 at 21; Gregory, Legislative Loss Distribution
in Negligence Actions, (1936) 134; Pollock, The Law of Torts, (1936)
166; Prosser, Torts (1941) 388, 389; 3 Restatement of Torts sec. 466;
1 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, (1906) 166; Warren, Volenti Non
Fit Injuria, (1908) 20 Harv. L. R. 461.
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found in going ahead with full knowledge of the risk.' 17 On
the other hand, a risk is not "voluntarily" encountered when an
employer has promised to remedy a defective condition and has
failed to do so, at least until it appears that he will not make the
promised repair;1"'

though it is so encountered where the em-

ployee has a choice of ways to perform his work and does it in
the more dangerous way,'"0 or receives extra pay for more
hazardous employment.' 8l' Within the limitation of this requirement, it is held that seamen and convicts do not assume the risks
of their respective employments, for obedience to direction or
continuance of employment in such cases cannot be said to be
voluntary.8

2

It is usually assumed in cases involving the possessor

of property and his guest, that the conduct of the guest on the
premises, after knowledge of peril, is "voluntary" within the
meaning of the doctrine.' 83 A limitation on the doctrine of assumption of risk has been presented in the cases and suggestions
of commentators that if the purpose for which the injured party
acts is socially justifiable, and he is constrained so to act by the
pressure of necessity, his conduct in encountering a known peril
is not "voluntary" because he is given no actual choice of conduct.
This interpretation of the requirement of the doctrine received
considerable attention in cases where it was claimed that the
servant was not volens because he had no actual freedom of choice
in encountering a risk on the premises of the master, for the
alternative was a loss of his means of existence. 8 4 The same rule
was adopted with reference to conduct of an individual attempting
"7SProsser, Torts, (1941) 384, 513, and cases cited. See also Labatt,
Master and Servant, (1913) 3630, with reference to the American rule.
The early English cases (including Yarmouth v. France, (1887) 19 Q. B. D.
647, 57 L. J. Q. B. 7, 36 W. R. 281, and dicta in Britton v. Great Western
Cotton Co., (1872) L. R. 7 Ex. 130, 41 L. J. Ex. 99, 27 L. T. 125) had so
held, but later cases (Thomas v. Quartermaine, (1887) 18 Q. B. D. 645,
56 L. J. Q. B. 340, 57 L. T. 537, and Smith v. Baker & Sons, (1891) A. C.
325, 60 L. J. Q. B. 683, 65 L. T. 467) established the rule that mere knowledge of danger and continuance in the employment was not sufficient to
invoke the maxim, and further proof that the servant was volens was
required under the English rule. See Labatt, ibid, at 3622; 1 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (1906) 169.
I75 9 Prosser, ibid. 389; Labatt, ibid. 3242.
' OLabatt, 3097.
'8'Ibid. 3645, 3646.
182Ibid. 3246-3250.
1 3 See cases cited in first paragraph of note 138, supra; and see Osborne
v. London & North Western Ry. Co., (1888) 21 Q. B. D. 220, 57 L. J.
Q. B. 618, 59 L. T. 227, 52 J. P. 806.
1s4See extended discussion and quotations from cases dealing with this
problem in Labatt, Master and Servant, (1913) 3946, 3950, and Prosser,
Torts, (1941) 391.
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a rescue, 115 and to cases involving defective ways.8s That is not
to say that every attempt to complete a rescue, nor every adventure
in passing over a dangerously defective way because it might be
more convenient than any other way, is considered as an involuntary action excepted from the operation of the doctrine. It has
been variously stated that the risk must not be "unreasonably"
undertaken,' 7 or must arise from "necessity,"''5 or that the plaintiff must be able to "reasonably elect"' 6 whether to encounter the
danger or not. The theory is implicit in Pollock's suggestion that
the doctrine is properly applicable only when a "man goes out
of his way to a dangerous action or state of things. '
Does not this variation of the doctrine essentially destroy what
Professor Warren and all the earlier writers declared to be the
distinction between contributory negligence and assumption of
risk that "It may be consistent with due care to incur a known
If the above suggestion
danger voluntarily and deliberately" ?'
made by courts and commentators is correct, the danger ceases
to be encountered voluntarily when "due care" is used, or the risk
taken is "reasonable" or "necessary." If it may be said that one
may "reasonably" encounter a known and appreciated danger
without application of the doctrine of assumption of risk and
"reasonableness" is the essence of the doctrine (as contributory
negligence is normally dependent on the care of a "reasonable"
855 See text statements cited at note 176, supra, and cases noted therein;
and see 3 Restatement of Torts sec. 472.
'"Sce cases cited at note 163, supra. As to the same result where the
doctrines of assumption of risk and contributory negligence have been confused, see cases cited at note 164, supra, and Harper, The Law of Torts
(1933) 295, 296.
187See Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, (1906) 20 Harv. L. R.
21: ". . . one who has the legal right or legal or social duty to act as he
has done under the conditions created by the defendant's wrong does not
act voluntarily; his action is caused by the coercion of the circumstances
which the defendant's wrong has created. In all, the plaintiff had a right
to do what he did or be where he was injured which was in no way dependent upon the mere consent of the defendant, a consent which he was free to
give or withhold." It would seem that once the consent had been given,
however, the plaintiff had a legal right to act as he did in all cases, unless
he acted unreasonably. The standard of "reasonableness" has been generally
accepted: See 3 Restatement of Torts sec. 468, 472, 473; the early case of
Clayards v. Dethick & Davis, (1848) 12 Q. B. 439; Gover v. Central Vermont Ry. Co., (1922) 96 Vt. 208, 118 Atl. 874; Harper, The Law of Torts,
(1933) 294, 295.
"'1Williams v. Main Island Creek Coal Co., (1919) 83 W. Va. 464,
98 S.5 E. 511.
1' Thomas v. Quartermaine, (1887) 18 Q. B. D. 645, 56 L. J. Q. B.
340, 22 L. T. 125; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Lewis, (1912) 103 Ark.
99, 145 S.W. 898.
'0OPollock, The Law of Torts, (1923) 164.
'6 'Warren, Volenti Non Fit Injuria, (1908) 20 Harv. L. R. 461.
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man), then-the entire doctrine is nothing more nor less than contributory negligence itself, in so far as it relates to the conduct
of the plaintiff as distinguished from an unqualified limitation of
the duty of the defendant. The servant of a third party working
on the premises of the possessor and encountering a dangerous
condition *thereon; the licensee slipping on the icy steps of the
licensor's building; and the rescuer attempting to save his home
or his family, it would seem, are subject to the doctrine only if
they act "unreasonably," for only then is their action "voluntary"
within the requirement of the doctrine. In short, the answer to
the question of whether the conduct of the plaintiff was "voluntary" involves weighing the factors of probability of harm, choice
of other conduct, and social justifiability of plaintiff's act, and
balancing them against the conduct of the reasonably prudent man.
The ultimate result appears to be that before the doctrine of assumption of risk can be applied, in cases relating to the "conduct"
of the plaintiff, the requirements of the doctrine of contributory
negligence must first be satisfied. The overlapping between the
two doctrines arising from the interpretation of the requirement
"2of "voluntary" action has been noted by other commentators '
Of course, the very term "voluntary" suggests an element of
compulsion, in the light of which the actor proceeds as he makes
a "reasonable" or "unreasonable" choice as to his mode of conduct. But the theory of compulsion varies from the extreme expounded by Lord Bramwell,1 93 who conceived everything done by
an actor as voluntary if not done under physical constriction, and
that of Mr. Justice Holmes, -who held that mere inconvenience was
4
sufficient to prevent the application of the rule." A more realistic
approach would be to permit the matter to be decided in all cases
on the basis of the reasonableness of the conduct of the plaintiff
and eliminate in theory what courts have already eliminated in
fact: the element of compulsion in the requirements of the doctrine
that the action of the plaintiff be "voluntary."
The requirement of "voluntary" action by the plaintiff has not
been critically considered as an element in the application of the
doctrine in cases relating to the automobile guest, although the con1'Harper, The Law of Torts, (1933) 294, 295; Prosser, Torts, (1941)
378, 379.
193 See Ogden v. Rummens, (1863) 3 F. & F. 751, wherein Lord Brainwell said. concerning the statement of a workman that he feared loss of
employment and hence did not complain of a dangerous condition: "What
is volens? Willing; and a man is willing when he wills to do a thing and
does it."
19'Pomeroy v. Westfield, (1891) 154 Mass. 462, 28 N. E. 899.
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nection between the "voluntary" action of the plaintiff and his
consent to incur the risk has been emphasized. 195 In cases setting
out the requirements of the rule, it has been suggested that the
voluntary action of the plaintiff is a prerequisite to the application
of the doctrine, 19" and the Connecticut court, adopting the analogy
of other cases, has held that the term "voluntary" is used in the
sense of an unreasonable election to encounter a risk, refusing to
apply the doctrine in the case of two women passengers aged 16
and 60, who failed to get out of the car at night after knowledge
that the driver was tired and was afraid he would go to sleep.,,,
Some courts apparently have dropped the requirement that the
action of the guest must be "voluntary" and have suggested that
the evidence must show an "acquiescence or willingness to proceed
in the face of danger."'"" The requirement for "voluntary" action
in such case, of course, is almost exactly the same as that well
recognized rule of contributory negligence which classifies acquiescence in the reckless management of an automobile as contributory negligence as a matter of law. The affinity of the two doctrines
seems thus manifest both in principle and in practice.
Illustrative of the interpretation of the term "voluntary" in the
automobile cases, it may be noted that it has been held, conx':White, Liability of an Automobile Driver to a Non-Paying Passenger. (1934) 20 Va. L. R. 326, 348: "In its application to the passenger, the
foundation or major premises of the assumption of risk theory is that in so
far as the driver is concerned, the passenger voluntarily takes his place as
a passenger in the car. If the passenger has no right to enter the car without the driver's consent, and no coercion is exerted to cause him to enter
the car, or to remain in it, then by entering or remaining in the car, the
passenger impliedly, if not in words, consents to all of those things of which
lie bas no-tice. Having consented to them, he assumes in so far as the driver
is concerned the risk of injury that flows from them."
11"'The idea seems to be implicit in the case of Cruden v. Fentham,
(1799) 2 Esp. 685, and is specifically expressed in 'McGeever v. O'Byrne.
(1919) 203 Ala. 266, 82 So. 508 and Guile v. Greenberg, (1934) 192 Minn.
548, 257 N. W. 649.
1
'1Fredman v. Hurwitz, (1933) 116 Conn. 283, 164 Atl. 647. And
apparently the question as to whether the plaintiff acted voluntarily in
remaining in a vehicle with knowledge of reckless driving by the host has
been considered as a question of her "reasonableness" in continuing the
journey. See Hemington v. Hemington, (1922) 221 'Mich. 206, 190 N. W.
203.
I' 'Knipfer v. Shaw, (1933) 210 Wis. 617, 246 N. W. 328. This interpretation seems to have been generally adopted. See Wright v. Sellers,
(1938) 25 Cal. App. (2d) 590, 78 P. (2d) 209; White v. McVicker, (1933)
216 Iowa 90, 246 N. W. 385; Edwards v. Kirk, (1940) 227 Iowa 684, 288
N. W. 875; Pinckard v. Pease, (1921) 155 Wash. 282, 197 Pac. 49; Young
v. Nunn, Bush & Weldon Shoe Co., (1933) 212 Wis. 403, 249 N. W. 278;
Switzer v. Weiner, (1939) 230 Wis. 599, 284 N. W. 509, and especially the
case of Helgestad v. North, (1940) 233 Wis. 349, 289 N. W. 822, emphasizing this requirement of the doctrine.
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formable to the rule in the master and servant cases, that a person
in the custody of law enforcement officers assumes no risk of
injury arising from the incompetence of the driver, 09 or defects in
the mechanical condition of the vehicle.20 0 And in an eminently
sensible decision, the Wisconsin court has suggested that it was
unreasonable for a passenger to continue transportation with a
drunken, sleepy driver when it was possible for him to debark
and spend the remainder of the night at a tavern.20 1

B.

ELEMENTS OF "KNOWLEDGE" AND "APPRECIATION"
AS INDISTINGUISHABLE

FROM CONTRIBUTORY

OF PERIL

NEGLIGENCE

It must be obvious that in order to have an assumption of a
risk there must be knowledge, actual or implied, of the existence
of the risk itself, and courts have so held. But what kind of
"knowledge" must be shown? A man taking a journey upon a
railroad train knows when he leaves the station that some element
of risk is attached to the adventure; a man crossing the street
knows that there is a possibility that in the movement of traffic
an untoward occurrence may take place which will cause him
damage; a man getting into a bath tub realizes that certain risks
are involved in his bathing activities. So, also, a man accepting
the hospitality of a drunken, reckless driver knows that some
risk is present. The knowledge may be a part of the actor's general intellectual inheritance, or it may be a present foreboding of
danger accompanied by a determination to encounter whatever risk
may be involved. In any of the cases suggested, it might properly

be said that "knowledge" of the risk was present in the mind of the
actor. But the question of the quantum of "knowledge" necessary,
and the distinction, if any there be, between the knowledge of
peril necessary to support the doctrine of assumption of risk and
that necessary to support of a finding of contributory negligence
has not received the specific attention of the courts.
It is obvious, of course, that as a matter of proof it is impossible to show that the individual against whom the doctrine is
sought to be invoked had actual knowledge of the peril. While a
limited number of courts, under peculiar circumstances presented
by individual cases, have held that actual knowledge must be
299Kuhle v. Ladwig, (1941) 237 Wis. 147, 295 N. W. 41.
20ORusso v. State, (1938) 166 Misc. Rep. 316, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 350.
2OlMarkovich v. Schlafke, (1939) 230 Wis. 639, 284 N. W. 516.
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proved,! 2 it has been said in most jurisdictions that the requirements of the doctrine have been satisfied when it appears that
the plaintiff (regardless of his mental state) had or should have
had knowledge of the existence of the dangerous condition. 20 3
In either case, an objective standard must be set up by which to
measure the knowledge of the plaintiff. Courts have not been
clear as to the nature of the standard, and the decisions are of
little assistance in establishing the circumstances under which it
must be said that knowledge of the danger is apparent. Nor is
there any way of distinguishing this requirement from the general
requisite in the contributory negligence doctrine that one must
act as a reasonably prudent man. The distinction which immediately presents itself suggests that under the doctrine of assumption of risk the plaintiff is under a duty to know the facts before
him, but not (as sometimes obtains in the doctrine of contributory
negligence) to engage in an exploration to ascertain what specific
dangers may be encountered, or to investigate potential perils.
But such a distinction concerns verbiage rather than substance.
" 0"Gentzkow v. Portland Ry. Co., (1909) 54 Or. 114, 102 Pac. 614,
(licensor-licensee) ; National Motor Vehicle Co. v. Kellum, (1915) 184 Ind.
457, 109 N. E. 196, (semble: where mechanic riding in racing car was killed
because of latent defect in the track and his representative sued the owner
of the track and mechanic's employer, it was held that the mechanic did
not assume the risk where he did not know and had no opportunity of learning of the defect since it was not his duty to inspect the roadway, but the
principle adopted might properly be classified also as a refusal to find that
the deceased had acted other than a reasonably prudent man would have
acted) ; Hathaway v. New York N. H. & H. R. Co., (1902) 182 Mass.
286, 65 N. E. 387; Warren v. Boston & M. R. R., (1895) 163 Mass. 484,
40 N. E. 895.
2""As to cases involving master and servant, see those collected by
Labatt, Master and Servant, (1913) 3620, 3621, and his suggestion: "Where
direct proof of the servant's knowledge is not obtainable, the problem for
solution is whether the circumstances are such that constructive notice of
the danger must be imputed to him. The point to be determined is whether
the servant ought, as a reasonably careful man, to have ascertained the
nature and extent of the perils to which he was exposed"; see also Beatman
v. Miles, (1921) 27 Wyo. 481, 199 Pac. 933; Seaboard Airline R. Co. v.
Horton, (1914) 233 U. S.492, 58 L. Ed. 1062, 34 Sup. Ct. 635, rev'g (1913)
162 N. C. 424, 78 S.C. 494; Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Wright, (1914) 235
U. S.375, 59 L. Ed. 277, 35 Sup. Ct. 130; as to licensee-licensor cases, see
Hanley v. Eastern Steamship Corp., (1915) 221 Mass. 125, 109 N. E. 167;
cases cited in note 138, supra; Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Monroe,
(1931) 237 Ky. 60, 34 S. W. (2d) 929; Lorenzo v. Atlantic etc. R. Co.,
(1915) 101 S.C. 409, 85 S.E. 964; Hopkins v. West Jersey & S. Ry. Co.,
(1909) 225 Pa. St. 193, 73 Atl. 1104; as to cases involving defective ways,
see City of Columbus v. Griggs, (1901) 113 Ga. 597, 38 S.E. 953; semble:
Williams v. Main Island Creek Coal Co., (1919) 83 W. Va. 464, 98 S. E.
511, and cases cited. And see Lee v. B. & 0. R. Co., (1914) 246 Pa. St. 566,
92 Atl. 719: "He assumed the risk of the danger he had reason to apprehend but not that of which he had neither knowledge nor means of knowledge ......
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It is assumed in either situation that a greater or lesser degree
of peril exists and that the actor knows of it: under neither
doctrine can it be said that one is guilty of legal fault, if, seeing
what is obvious, there is no indication of danger in a course of
conduct subsequently pursued; and if danger is discernible in the
circumstances there is "knowledge" for the purpose of assumption
of risk and that of contributory negligence as well. Although it
is occasionally suggested that the peril must be more immediate, or
of a more dangerous nature to invoke the doctrine of assumption
of risk than that of contributory negligence, courts seldom have
accepted this conclusion, and a distinction between classifications
of legal fault based upon the degree of observability of a danger
was found to be a quicksand when applied in the early cases relating to slight, ordinary and gross negligence.
The only general rule which would seem to apply in measuring the quantum of peril which must be known to justify the
application of the doctrine of assumption of risk is that the doctrine is involved when such knowledge of the risk is apparent
that a reasonably prudent man would not have encountered it
under all the circumstances. In view of the use of that standard
in the contributory negligence cases, it would seem improper to
require less care; the standard is substantially that which is now
applied in the cases relating to assumption of risk,2' 4 and, in any
event, no more definitive standard of measurement of the amount
of risk necessary to impute "knowledge" appears to be available.
It has often been suggested that not only must the circumstances out of which the potential perils arise be "known," but
the danger involved must also be "appreciated" by the actor. As
in cases involving "knowledge" of peril, the courts in ascertaining the existence of "appreciation" of the risk seek to establish
an essentially subjective standard of conduct by reference to objective circumstances. Hence the observations above, made with
reference to the requirement of the doctrine that the risk be
"known," apply with additional force to interpretation of the term
"appreciated" as an element of the concept. Especially does the
measurement of legal fault here depend on factors completely incapable of proof except by conclusions of the courts that specified
conduct shows the nature of the state of mind of the actor. Here
also the affinity to the contributory negligence theory is manifest.
2041bid. See, especially, Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Wright, (1914) 235
U. S. 376, 59 L. Ed. 277, 35 Sup. Ct. 130, and Lorenzo v. Atlantic etc. R.
Co. (1915) 101 S. C. 409, 85 S. E. 964, for well articulated techniques in
ascertaining the existence of "knowledge."
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Since the law takes no account of a mental attitude, except in so
far as it may express itself in overt acts, the investigation of
whether the danger has been "appreciated" must be determined on
the same circumstances as those which suggest the inquiry whether
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.205
C.

Tim

REQUIREMENTS OF "KNOWLEDGE" AND "APPRECIATION"
IN THE AUTOMOBILE CASES

Where, in automobile cases, the doctrine is used to limit the
"duty" of the defendant, a showing of plaintiff's "knowledge"
and "appreciation" of peril is obviously unnecessary.
Where the term is used in describing the "conduct" of the
guest, the impact on the automobile cases of the requirements
that the danger be "known" and "appreciated" is important. In
these cases, the courts have had to meet a dilemma in application of the doctrine: If the requirements of the doctrine are that
actual knowledge and appreciation of danger must be proved,
the doctrine will in normal conditions be inapplicable, for proof
of the mental state of the guest would be impossible without the
legal fiction of constructive knowledge and appreciation; while
if knowledge and appreciation of the risk were to be imputed to
him from the facts surrounding the journey, the courts would be
hard pressed to find a standard of conduct by which to measure
the fault of the plaintiff and the legal consequences attendant
thereto, distinguishable, as are the consequences of the application of the doctrine, from the concept of contributory negligence.
Here the essential question revolves around the area of risk
which must be known before the doctrine must be invoked. Obviously, exact anticipation of the damage is not required; if
damage through the misconduct of the host were a certainty, the
guest would never embark on the adventure. Obviously also a
mere foreboding of injury, unconnected with any of the characteristics of the host as a driver, or known defects in his vehicle,
would be insufficient to justify the application of the rule. Thus
the question in these cases is not ultimately whether the guest
must know and appreciate the existence of a risk, but what degree
of knowledge and understanding will suffice to invoke the doctrine.
.\ jury may be instructed that to apply principles of assumption
of risk, it must appear that the plaintiff knew and appreciated
the danger, but the quantum of knowledge and appreciation of
"'-,
Cf. Labatt, Master and Servant, (1913) 3619, as to the same theory
with reference to "volens."

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

peril will still be unmeasured. Some courts have suggested that
the doctrine is applicable if the plaintiff knew and appreciated,"0 0
or ought to have known and appreciated, 20 7 the peril, while other
courts have dealt with similar factual situations on the assumption that constructive knowledge and appreciation of peril is sufficient.20s Here the analogy to the doctrine of contributory negligence becomes pronounced. Where, as here, the question of constructive knowledge and appreciation is involved, it is unimportant whether the problem is posed as one of constructive knowledge and appreciation in the first place or whether the jury is
asked to say that the plaintiff knew and appreciated, or ought to
have known and appreciated the peril. Ultimately, the suggestions
are only two ways of saying the same thing; and in either case
the reference to be made by the jury essentially relates to whether
the plaintiff knew and realized that which, as a reasonably prudent man, he should have known and realized.
Where the question has been raised as to whether the verdict
of the jury is sustained by substantial evidence, the approach of
the courts is substantially the same as where contributory negli206
Knipfer v. Shaw, (1933) 210 Wis. 617, 246 N. W. 328, sets out the
standard rule for automobile cases in that state, holding the doctrine to be
applicable when the following is shown: "(1) a hazard or danger inconsistent with the safety ot the guest; (2) knowledge and appreciation of the
hazard by the guest; and (3) acquiescence or a willingness to proceed in the
face of the danger." The measurement of the quantum of danger apparent in
circumstances, by which actual and constructive knowledge and appreciation
of the hazard is measured as a matter of law, is treated in an excellent
Comment, (1937) 12 Wisc. L. R. 376, 378-380, and Wisconsin cases cited.
See also White v. McVicker, (1933) 216 Iowa 90, 246 N. W. 385, and
Edwards v. Kirk, (1940) 227 Iowa 684, 288 N. W. 875; McGeever v.
O'Byrne, (1919) 203 Ala. 266, 82 So. 508; Guile v. Greenberg, (1934) 192
Minn.
207548, 257 N. W. 649.
Marks v. Dorkin, (1927) 105 Conn. 521, 136 At. 83: "Contributory
negligence or assumption of risk in relation to the negligent driving of a
car cannot arise until it is disclosed to, or ought to have been known to, the

guest that the driver is driving negligently. . .. ;" and see Freedman v.

Hurwitz, (1933) 116 Conn. 283, 164 Atl. 647, saying that the guest must
or ought reasonably to have perceived that peril existed, before the doctrine
is applicable.
208
See Hall v. Wilkerson, (Mo. App. 1935) 84 S.W. (2d) 1063, holding that where an automobile had twice skidded on icy pavement and guest
knew "something of the risk" she was taking and asked the host to "drive
slow," "there was no evidence showing that plaintiff voluntarily exposed
herself to a known and appreciated danger due to the wrongful act of the
defendant; hence, she did not assume the risk." Nardone v. Milton Fire
Dist., (1941) 261 App. Div. 717, 27 N. Y. S. (2d) 489; Pettys v. Leith,
(1933) 62 S. D. 149, 252 N. W. 18; Krueger v. Krueger, (1929) 197 Wis.
588, 222 N. W. 784; a case where the driver fell asleep on day following
a night spent in the car due to a breakdown of the car: "She [plaintiff]
was bound to know, as a matter of common knowledge, that a result such
as did follow, viz., of the defendant dozing at the wheel, was reasonably
to be expected as an aftermath of the experience which they had all undergone since the preceding noon, although she testified to the contrary. . ."
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gence as a matter of law is urged as a bar to the plaintiff's action.
Factual situations slip into more or less conventional patterns,
ultimately resulting in a very general rule of conduct said to constitute contributory negligence or assumption of risk. As with
the doctrine of contributory negligence in the automobile accident
field, however, a multitude of factors, never twice the same, must
be weighed to determine the presence of knowledge and appreciation of peril in each case, and accurate prognostication as to the
effect of the presence of one factor or set of factors is difficult.
Nowhere is a general standard set forth to guide either the
jury or the courts as to the quantum of knowledge necessary to
invoke the doctrine.
Many of the cases, however, illustrate the extreme flexibility
of the requirement of "knowledge" when applied in designating
the scope of the area of conduct in which the doctrine is controlling. Where former recklessness of the host is known, 20

9

it is

sometimes said that this constitutes knowledge of a peril although
it has also been suggested that knowledge of such a general
nature is insufficient to support the doctrine.2

10

It has been held

that one permitting another to back out into the street without
looking does not have such knowledge of peril as to justify the
application of the doctrine.211 The decisions setting out the degree
of knowledge necessary to show that the guest assumes the risk
of the failure of the host to keep a proper lookout seem hopelessly
confused,212 and amply illustrate that "knowledge" and "apprecia200Knowledge by a guest of former recklessness of his host is discussed

in detail in the second section of this article, at notes 274-279.
21.'See, e. g., Marks v. Dorkin, (1927) 105 Conn. 521, 136 Atl. 83.
""Fischer v. London Guarantee and Accident Co., (1939) 230 Wis. 47,
283 N. W. 295: "She did testify that she looked to the rear and observed
the position of the car with respect to the pavement and felt that there was
no danger. The encroachment by her side of the car was considerably less
than . . . by the left side of the car. She perhaps did not appreciate the

fact that the position of the car was in an oblique position. She was . ..
a guest . . . and the duty which rested on her was clearly not as great as

...upon
her husband."
212'Where host and guest were driving together in a heavy fog and
host was watching his side and guest was watching hers, it was held that
the guest assumed the risk of the journey because she had knowledge of
how difficult it was for the host to see. Knipfer v. Shaw, (1933) 210 Wis.
617, 246 N. W. 328. But where the host was operating the automobile in a
driving rain and overlooked warning signs on a road under construction
and finally ran into a road barrier, the court set aside a verdict of the jury
that the guest had assumed the risk. Cummings v. Nelson, (1933) 213 Wis.
121, 250 N. W. 759. And where the windshield of the guest was covered
with snow so that he could not tell that the driver was in part on the
wrong side of the road he did not assume the risks arising from such
driving, for he could not see how the driver was operating the car. Duss
v. Friess, (1937) 225 Wis. 406, 273 N. W. 547.
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tion" are words of elastic import in fact measured (as under the
doctrine of contributory negligence) by ascertaining what conduct
may be reasonable under all the circumstances. In one case where
the host had a tendency toward speeding, and on the trip in
question speeded up more than usual, a new trial was granted
upon a verdict for the guest where he knew of the general tendency of the host toward speeding ;213 and it has been held that
where the guest had knowledge of excessive speed and protested,
21 4
the guest could assume that the driver would heed the protest.

And in a case where the guest was teaching the host how to drive,
it was held that "it might be inferred that the plaintiff would
reasonably assume that there was no danger" in so doing, even
though the incompetence of the host was clear..2 15 It has been held
also that one knowing of a defective door, which during the
journey swung open and caused damage to the guest, did not
voluntarily expose himself to a "known risk" by riding next to
the door;h1

and that when the guest had an opportunity to

leave the vehicle after knowledge of the recklessness of the driver
she assumed no risk in law, for the driver had in fact made reckless use of the faculties which she had. 217 Other courts have said,
where a guest was sitting in the front seat of the vehicle when
vision was obscured, that he was 218 and was not 2 0 chargeable
with knowledge that the driver would be unable to stop within
the range of the assured clear distance ahead. Still another case
has held that knowledge is not in fact required, making application of the doctrine in a case involving an individual so completely
intoxicated as to be unable to comprehend that the host was in
a drunken state. 2
The method of interpretation of the requirements of the doctrine as above set forth amply illustrates the similarity of the
judicial approach in the application of the doctrine of contributory negligence and that of assumption of risk. The rationalization of a distinction between the two theories rests upon the assumption that the plaintiff ought to be subjected to greater disability from recovery of the defendant where he knowingly en-13Fontaine v. Fontaine, (1931) 205 Wis. 570, 238 N. W. 410.
' Ragland v. Snotzmeier, (1933) 186 Ark. 778, 55 S. W. (2d) 932.
215Holland v. Pitocchelli, (1938) 299 Mass. 554, 13 N. E. (2d) 390.
216
Zimmer v. Little (1940) 138 Pa. Super. 374, 10 A. (2d) 911. The
case treated the doctrines of assumption of risk and contributory negligence
without distinction between the two.
217Hemington
v. Hemington, (1922) 221 Mich. 206, 190 N. W. 203.
21
s1Aalker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Company, (1934) 214 Wis.
519, 21
252 N. W. 721.
91-Ielgestad v. North, (1940) 233 Wis. 349, 289 N. W. 822.
22oSchubring v. Weggen, (1940) 234 Wis. 517, 291 N. W. 788.
2 14

THE RATIONALE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK

counters a risk than where he carelessly or inadvertently encounters
a risk. If a measurement of the subjective quality of plaintiff's
actual "knowledge" were practicable, this distinction might be
justified from an ethical standpoint. But such differentiation breaks
down when it is noted that in decisions utilizing the "assumption
of risk" concept, it is generally conceded that knowledge of peril
may be constructive as well as actual. In neither doctrine may it
be said that there is a definitive content in the basic rule of conduct: Whether a man should act as a reasonably prudent man,
or whether a man must be said to know and appreciate an area of
peril at the point when he ought, as a reasonably prudent man,
to know and appreciate it. There seems to be no logical reason
why the standard of measurement of the extent of the knowledge
and appreciation of danger necessary to invoke an application of
the rule of assumption of risk should not generally be announced
to be the conduct of a reasonably prudent man in like circumstances-the same rule as now obtains in the field of contributory
negligence.
D. QUESTIONs FOR THE JURY
One of the most confusing features about the doctrine of assumption of risk, at first examination, is that of determining what
questions are to be decided by the jury. This arises from the
dual nature of the use of the term "assumption of risk," which
in one area refers to the "duty" owed by the defendant and at
another point to the "conduct" of the plaintiff. Where it is said
that a trespasser coming on to the land of another "assumes the
risk" of the condition of the premises (meaning that no duty is
owed the trespasser by the possessor to make the premises safe
for his reception), the question relates to a standard of legal conduct, referable to legal principles principally in the absence of
dispute of fact as to the status of the injured party as a trespasser,
and must be determined by the court as a matter of legal duty.
But where the definitive standard of care constitutes a bar
to an action by the plaintiff for misconduct of the defendant which
in the absence of the exercise of such care by the plaintiff would
give rise to a cause of action for damages, determination of specific factual conclusions within the framework of the legal principles enunciated is imperative. Where the doctrine requires, as
it does in such cases, knowledge and appreciation of the risk involved, and volitional action by the plaintiff, the presence of such
factors has been traditionally determined by the jury. Citations
on the subject could be multiplied, but it is sufficient to say that

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

among many cases examined the writer has discovered no decision applying the doctrine in which this conclusion has been
challenged. 221 It ought also be noted that not only are questions
relating to the requirements of the doctrine matters for jury determination, but so also are questions of causation. In automobile
cases especially, it has been noted that the question of whether the
risk assumed, or another peril, caused the plaintiff's damage is
222
properly a question for the jury.

The division of duties between the court and jury in such cases
is analogous to that in the case of contributory negligence. The
degree of knowledge, appreciation or voluntary conduct which is
sufficient to justify the application of the doctrine may be more
or less precisely defined by one or more precedents set up by
the same or other appellate courts. Where factual situations have
recurred with an indeterminate amount of frequency, as has been
suggested with reference to the cases involving the content of
the requirement of "knowledge," it is possible to find some guide
in the decisions to establish, as a matter of law, the realm within
which the decision of the jury may be made. The extent of the
restriction of the right of an appellate tribunal to reverse the findings of the trial jury has not been definitely stated. In theory the
jury resolves all conflict in the testimony. Where the problem
arises as to inferences to be drawn from admitted facts (i.e.,
whether the facts show that the guest acted with constructive
knowledge, or voluntarily, or whether the damage resulted from
the risk assumed or one not assumed), appellate courts have followed the general rule that if only one inference can reasonably
be drawn, a verdict at variance with such inference must be set
aside upon appeal. In a sense this sets up required standards of
conduct to which the plaintiff must conform or it will be said
that his acts preclude a recovery for damages otherwise recoverable.
(To be Continued)
22lSee Woodman v. Peck, (1939) 9 N. H. 292, 7 A. (2d) 251 in
which this theory was mentioned, but the doctrine of assumption of risk
not applied.
was 222
While courts have not discussed the causation of the damage suffered
as a question for the jury as often as consideration has been given the
requirements of the doctrine as appropriate for jury determination, it is
clear that this factor is a question of fact upon which the conclusion of the
jury is final. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Brown, (1918) 139 Tenn. 640, 202
S. W. 926; Madden v. Peart, (1930) 201 Wis. 259, 229 N. W. 57; Koscuik
v. Sherf, (1937) 224 Wis. 217, 272 N. W. 8, unless, "the only permissible
inference" (Thomas v. Steppert, (1930) 200 Wis. 388, 228 N. W. 513) is
that the accident happened from the risk assumed and the jury found otherwise, or there is no evidence to sustain the finding of the jury concerning
the relation of the risk assumed to the causation of the damage sustained,
(Schwab v. Martin, (1938) 228 Wis. 45, 279 N. W. 699).

